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POSTER: Probing Tor Hidden Service with Dockers

Authors:

Jonghyeon Park,

Youngseok LeeAuthors Info & Claims

CCS '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Pages 2571 - 2573

https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3138849

Published: 30 October 2017 Publication History

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Abstract

Tor is a commonly used anonymous network that provides the hidden services. As the number of hidden services using Tor's anonymous network has been steadily increasing every year, so does the number of services that abuse Tor's anonymity. The existing research on the Tor is mainly focused on Tor's security loopholes and anonymity. As a result, how to collect and analyze the contents of Tor's hidden services is not yet in full swing. In addition, due to the slow access speed of the Tor browser, it is difficult to observe the dynamics of the hidden services. In this work, we present a tool that can monitor the status of hidden services for the analysis of authentic hidden service contents, and have automated our tool with the virtualization software, Docker, to improve the crawling performance. From August 12, 2017 to August 20, 2017, we collected a total of 9,176 sites and analyzed contents for 100 pages.

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Cited By

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Pastor-Galindo JGómez Mármol FMartínez Pérez G(2023)On the gathering of Tor onion addressesFuture Generation Computer Systems10.1016/j.future.2023.02.024145:C(12-26)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.future.2023.02.024
Park JMun HLee Y(2018)Improving Tor Hidden Service Crawler Performance2018 IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing (DSC)10.1109/DESEC.2018.8625103(1-8)Online publication date: Dec-2018
https://doi.org/10.1109/DESEC.2018.8625103

Index Terms

POSTER: Probing Tor Hidden Service with Dockers
1. Networks
  1. Network services
    1. Cloud computing

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Information

Published In

CCS '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 2017

2682 pages

ISBN:9781450349468

DOI:10.1145/3133956

General Chair:
Bhavani Thuraisingham
The University of Texas at Dallas, USA
,
Program Chairs:
David Evans
University of Virginia
,
Tal Malkin
Columbia University
,
Dongyan Xu
Purdue University

Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 30 October 2017

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ITRC(Information Technology Research Center)

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CCS '17

Sponsor:

SIGSAC

CCS '17: 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 30 - November 3, 2017

Texas, Dallas, USA

Acceptance Rates

CCS '17 Paper Acceptance Rate 151 of 836 submissions, 18%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 1,234 of 6,846 submissions, 18%

Upcoming Conference

CCS '25

Sponsor:
sigsac

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 13 - 17, 2025

Taipei , Taiwan

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Cited By

View all

Pastor-Galindo JGómez Mármol FMartínez Pérez G(2023)On the gathering of Tor onion addressesFuture Generation Computer Systems10.1016/j.future.2023.02.024145:C(12-26)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.future.2023.02.024
Park JMun HLee Y(2018)Improving Tor Hidden Service Crawler Performance2018 IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing (DSC)10.1109/DESEC.2018.8625103(1-8)Online publication date: Dec-2018
https://doi.org/10.1109/DESEC.2018.8625103

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Recommendations

Spiders like Onions: on the Network of Tor Hidden Services

A first look at references from the dark to the surface web world: a case study in Tor

Security, information, and structure characterization of Tor: a survey