[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ skip to main content
research-article

Automatic Construction of Statechart-Based Anomaly Detection Models for Multi-Threaded Industrial Control Systems

Published: 24 February 2017 Publication History

Abstract

Traffic of Industrial Control System (ICS) between the Human Machine Interface (HMI) and the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is known to be highly periodic. However, it is sometimes multiplexed, due to asynchronous scheduling. Modeling the network traffic patterns of multiplexed ICS streams using Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) for anomaly detection typically produces a very large DFA and a high false-alarm rate. In this article, we introduce a new modeling approach that addresses this gap. Our Statechart DFA modeling includes multiple DFAs, one per cyclic pattern, together with a DFA-selector that de-multiplexes the incoming traffic into sub-channels and sends them to their respective DFAs. We demonstrate how to automatically construct the statechart from a captured traffic stream. Our unsupervised learning algorithms first build a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) from the stream. Next, we split the symbols into sets, one per multiplexed cycle, based on symbol frequencies and node degrees in the DTMC graph. Then, we create a sub-graph for each cycle and extract Euler cycles for each sub-graph. The final statechart is comprised of one DFA per Euler cycle. The algorithms allow for non-unique symbols, which appear in more than one cycle, and also for symbols that appear more than once in a cycle.
We evaluated our solution on traces from a production ICS using the Siemens S7-0x72 protocol. We also stress-tested our algorithms on a collection of synthetically-generated traces that simulated multiplexed ICS traces with varying levels of symbol uniqueness and time overlap. The algorithms were able to split the symbols into sets with 99.6% accuracy. The resulting statechart modeled the traces with a median false-alarm rate of as low as 0.483%. In all but the most extreme scenarios, the Statechart model drastically reduced both the false-alarm rate and the learned model size in comparison with the naive single-DFA model.

References

[1]
Sridhar Adepu and Aditya Mathur. 2016. Distributed detection of single-stage multipoint cyber attacks in a water treatment plant. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, AsiaCCS 2016. Xi’an, China, 449--460.
[2]
Afcon Technologies. 2015. PULSE HMI Software. Retrieved from http://www.afcon.co.il/product/pulse.
[3]
Cristina Alcaraz, Lorena Cazorla, and Gerardo Fernandez. 2015. Context-awareness using anomaly-based detectors for smart grid domains. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems, Vol. 8924. Springer International Publishing, 17--34.
[4]
A. Atassi, I. H. Elhajj, A. Chehab, and A. Kayssi. 2014. The State of the Art in Intrusion Prevention and Detection, Auerbach Publications. Auerbach Publications, Chapter 9: Intrusion Detection for SCADA Systems, 211--230.
[5]
L. Briesemeister, S. Cheung, U. Lindqvist, and A. Valdes. 2010. Detection, correlation, and visualization of attacks against critical infrastructure systems. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Privacy Security and Trust (PST’10). 17--19.
[6]
Eric J. Byres, Matthew Franz, and Darrin Miller. 2004. The use of attack trees in assessing vulnerabilities in SCADA systems. In Proceedings of the International Infrastructure Survivability Workshop.
[7]
M. Caselli, E. Zambon, and F. Kargl. 2015. Sequence-aware intrusion detection in industrial control systems. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security. 13--24.
[8]
Chia-Mei Chen, Han-Wei Hsiao, Peng-Yu Yang, and Ya-Hui Ou. 2013. Defending malicious attacks in cyber physical systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE 1st International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, Networks, and Applications (CPSNA’13). 13--18.
[9]
S. Cheung, B. Dutertre, M. Fong, U. Lindqvist, K. Skinner, and A. Valdes. 2007. Using model-based intrusion detection for SCADA networks. In Proceedings of the SCADA Security Scientific Symposium. 127--134.
[10]
Danny Dolev and Andrew C. Yao. 1981. On the Security of Public Key Protocols. Technical Report. Stanford, CA.
[11]
Electrical Engineering Blog. 2013. The top most used PLC systems around the world. Electrical installation 8 energy efficiency. Retrieved from http://engineering.electrical-equipment.org/electrical-distribution/the-top-most-used-plc-systems-around-the-world.html.
[12]
Noam Erez and Avishai Wool. 2015. Control variable classification, modeling and anomaly detection in Modbus/TCP SCADA systems. Int. J. Crit. Infrastruct. Prot. 10, C (Sept. 2015), 59--70.
[13]
N. Falliere, L. O. Murchu, and E. Chien. 2011. W32. stuxnet dossier. White paper, Symantec Corp., Security Response (2011).
[14]
I. N. Fovino, A. Carcano, T. De Lacheze Murel, A. Trombetta, and M. Masera. 2010. Modbus/DNP3 state-based intrusion detection system. In Proceedings of the 24th IEEE International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA). IEEE, 729--736.
[15]
Niv Goldenberg and Avishai Wool. 2013. Accurate modeling of Modbus/TCP for intrusion detection in {SCADA} systems. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 6, 2 (2013), 63--75.
[16]
D. Hadziosmanovic, D. Bolzoni, P. H. Hartel, and S. Etalle. 2011. MELISSA: Towards automated detection of undesirable user actions in critical infrastructures. In Proceedings of the European Conference on Computer Network Defense (EC2ND’11). IEEE Computer Society, 41--48.
[17]
David Harel. 1987. Statecharts: A visual formalism for complex systems. Sci. Comput. Program. 8, 3 (June 1987), 231--274.
[18]
Carl Hierholzer and Chr Wiener. 1873. Über die Möglichkeit, einen linienzug ohne wiederholung und ohne unterbrechung zu umfahren. Math. Ann. 6, 1 (1873), 30--32.
[19]
Amit Kleinmann and Avishai Wool. 2014. Accurate modeling of the Siemens S7 SCADA protocol for intrusion detection and digital forensic. JDFSL 9, 2 (2014), 37--50.
[20]
Amit Kleinmann and Avishai Wool. 2015. A statechart-based anomaly detection model for multi-threaded SCADA systems. In Pre-Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS’15). Fraunhofer IAIS, 139--150.
[21]
Ralph Langner. 2011. Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon. IEEE Security 8 Privacy 9, 3 (2011), 49--51.
[22]
T. D. Maiziere. 2014. Die Lage der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014. Technical Report.
[23]
Robert T. Marsh. 1997. Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures - The Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Technical Report.
[24]
Biswanath Mukherjee, L. Todd Heberlein, and Karl N. Levitt. 1994. Network intrusion detection. Network, IEEE 8, 3 (1994), 26--41.
[25]
Phillip A. Porras and Peter G. Neumann. 1997. EMERALD: Event monitoring enabling responses to anomalous live disturbances. In Proceedings of the 1997 National Information Systems Security Conference.
[26]
Martin Roesch. 1999. Snort - Lightweight intrusion detection for networks. In Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Conference on System Administration (LISA’99). USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, 229--238.
[27]
R. Sommer and V. Paxson. 2010. Outside the closed world: On using machine learning for network intrusion detection. In Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP’10). 305--316.
[28]
K. A. Stouffer, J. A. Falco, and K. A. Scarfone. 2013. Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security. Technical Report 800-82. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD.
[29]
David Urbina, Jairo Giraldo, Alvaro A. Cardenas, Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Junia Valente, Mustafa Faisal, Justin Ruths, Richard Candell, and Henrik Sandberg. 2016. Limiting the impact of stealthy attacks on industrial control systems. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS).
[30]
A. Valdes and S. Cheung. 2009. Communication pattern anomaly detection in process control systems. In IEEE Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST). IEEE, 22--29.
[31]
T. Wiens. 2014. S7comm Wireshark dissector plugin. Retrieved from http://sourceforge.net/projects/s7commwireshark Available at: http://sourceforge.net/projects/s7commwireshark.
[32]
Wikipedia. 2015. Variable-length quantity—Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Variable-length_quantity.
[33]
D. Yang, A. Usynin, and J. W. Hines. 2006. Anomaly-based intrusion detection for SCADA systems. In 5th Intl. Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control and Human Machine Interface Technologies. 12--16.
[34]
N. Ye, Y. Zhang, and C. M. Borror. 2004. Robustness of the Markov-chain model for cyber-attack detection. IEEE Transactions on Reliability 53, 1 (2004), 116--123.

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Anomaly Detection in SCADA Systems: A State Transition ModelingIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2024.337388121:3(3511-3521)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2024
  • (2024)Online Parallel Attack Detection Method for Industrial Control Based on Multi-Bandpass FilterIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2023.328643311:1(880-888)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2024
  • (2024)Mitigating Resource Depletion and Message Sequencing Attacks in SCADA SystemsAdvanced Information Networking and Applications10.1007/978-3-031-57870-0_4(37-47)Online publication date: 10-Apr-2024
  • Show More Cited By

Recommendations

Comments

Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology  Volume 8, Issue 4
Special Issue: Cyber Security and Regular Papers
July 2017
288 pages
ISSN:2157-6904
EISSN:2157-6912
DOI:10.1145/3055535
  • Editor:
  • Yu Zheng
Issue’s Table of Contents
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 24 February 2017
Accepted: 01 October 2016
Revised: 01 May 2016
Received: 01 December 2015
Published in TIST Volume 8, Issue 4

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Check for updates

Author Tags

  1. ICS
  2. S7
  3. SCADA
  4. Siemens
  5. Statechart
  6. network-intrusion-detection-system

Qualifiers

  • Research-article
  • Research
  • Refereed

Funding Sources

  • 10th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS 2015)
  • Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at TAU
  • Israeli Ministry of Science and Technology

Contributors

Other Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

  • Downloads (Last 12 months)18
  • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)2
Reflects downloads up to 16 Dec 2024

Other Metrics

Citations

Cited By

View all
  • (2024)Anomaly Detection in SCADA Systems: A State Transition ModelingIEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management10.1109/TNSM.2024.337388121:3(3511-3521)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2024
  • (2024)Online Parallel Attack Detection Method for Industrial Control Based on Multi-Bandpass FilterIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2023.328643311:1(880-888)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2024
  • (2024)Mitigating Resource Depletion and Message Sequencing Attacks in SCADA SystemsAdvanced Information Networking and Applications10.1007/978-3-031-57870-0_4(37-47)Online publication date: 10-Apr-2024
  • (2023)Hybrid Statistical-Machine Learning for Real-Time Anomaly Detection in Industrial Cyber–Physical SystemsIEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering10.1109/TASE.2021.307339620:1(32-46)Online publication date: Jan-2023
  • (2022)A Novel Anomaly Detection Method in Sensor Based Cyber-Physical SystemsIntelligent Automation & Soft Computing10.32604/iasc.2022.02662834:3(2083-2096)Online publication date: 2022
  • (2022)ShadowPLCs: A Novel Scheme for Remote Detection of Industrial Process Control AttacksIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2020.304626719:3(2054-2069)Online publication date: 1-May-2022
  • (2022)AGV Semantic Attack Detection Based on Hidden Markov Model2022 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)10.1109/ICIT48603.2022.10002828(1-5)Online publication date: 22-Aug-2022
  • (2022)An effective parameter tuned deep belief network for detecting anomalous behavior in sensor-based cyber-physical systemsTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2022.07.037931:C(142-151)Online publication date: 29-Sep-2022
  • (2022)Configuration Security for Sustainable Digital Twins of Industrial Automation and Control Systems in Emerging CountriesAI and IoT for Sustainable Development in Emerging Countries10.1007/978-3-030-90618-4_12(233-253)Online publication date: 31-Jan-2022
  • (2021)A Secure Intrusion Detection System in Cyberphysical Systems Using a Parameter-Tuned Deep-Stacked AutoencoderComputers, Materials & Continua10.32604/cmc.2021.01790568:3(3915-3929)Online publication date: 2021
  • Show More Cited By

View Options

Login options

Full Access

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

PDF

eReader

View online with eReader.

eReader

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

Share

Share

Share this Publication link

Share on social media