More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/

research-article

SoftGrid: A Software-based Smart Grid Testbed for Evaluating Substation Cybersecurity Solutions

Authors:

Prageeth Gunathilaka,

Daisuke Mashima,

Binbin ChenAuthors Info & Claims

CPS-SPC '16: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy

Pages 113 - 124

https://doi.org/10.1145/2994487.2994494

Published: 28 October 2016 Publication History

Abstract

Electrical substations are crucial for power grids. A number of international standards, such as IEC 60870 and 61850, have emerged to enable remote and automated control over substations. However, owing to insufficient security consideration in their design and implementation, the resulting systems could be vulnerable to cyber attacks. As a result, the modernization of a large number of substations dramatically increases the scale of potential damage successful attacks can cause on power grids. To counter such a risk, one promising direction is to design and deploy an additional layer of defense at the substations. However, it remains a challenge to evaluate various substation cybersecurity solutions in a realistic environment. In this paper, we present the design and implementation of SoftGrid, a software-based smart grid testbed for evaluating the effectiveness, performance, and interoperability of various security solutions implemented to protect the remote control interface of substations. We demonstrate the capability and usefulness of SoftGrid through a concrete case study. We plan to open-source SoftGrid to facilitate security research in related areas.

References

[1]

Facts and figures. http://www.singaporepower.com.sg/irj/servlet/prt/portal/prtroot/docs/guid/106b5b67-d148--2f10--14a7-a6b7bbef1871?sppatab=About%20SP%20PowerAssets. {accessed on 7-Apr-2016}.

[2]

Iec 60870-5-104 master driver manual. https://www.kepware.com/products/kepserverex/drivers/iec-60870-5-104-master/documents/iec-60870-5-104-master-manual/. {accessed on 25-Jul-2016}.

[3]

Ieee 118-bus system. http://icseg.iti.illinois.edu/ieee-118-bus-system/. {accessed on 28-Jul-2016}.

[4]

Kw-61850. http://www.keweitech.com/product_more.asp?id=45. {accessed on 16-Jun-2016}.

[5]

Mininet. http://mininet.org. {accessed on 28-Jul-2016}.

[6]

National SCADA test bed: Fact sheet. http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/NSTB_Fact_Sheet_FINAL_09-16-09.pdf. {accessed on 19-Jul-2016}.

[7]

OpenMUC. https://www.openmuc.org. {accessed on 7-Apr-2016}.

[8]

PowerWorld. http://www.powerworld.com/. {accessed on 7-Apr-2016}.

[9]

Raspberry Pi 1 Model B. https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/model-b/. {accessed on 22-Jun-2016}.

[10]

SPIDER-Switches. http://www.hirschmann.com/en/Hirschmann_Produkte/Industrial_Ethernet/Unmanaged-Switches/SPIDER-Switches/index.phtml. {accessed on 08-Jul-2016}.

[11]

Texas 2000-june 2016. http://icseg.iti.illinois.edu/synthetic-power-cases/texas2000-june2016/. {accessed on 28-Jul-2016}.

[12]

Tofino pre-defined protocols, controllers and applications. https://www.tofinosecurity.com/sites/default/files/AN-113-Tofino-Pre-Defined-Controllers-and-Protocols.pdf.pdf. {accessed on 19-Jul-2016}.

[13]

Uiuc 150-bus system. http://icseg.iti.illinois.edu/synthetic-power-cases/uiuc-150-bus-system/. {accessed on 28-Jul-2016}.

[14]

WECC-0100 proposed transient voltage criteria. https://www.wecc.biz/. {accessed on 7-Apr-2016}.

[15]

Bueno Electric. Iec-60850 gateways. http://www.buenoptic.net/iec-61850-gateways. {accessed on 16-Jun-2016}.

[16]

F. Cleveland. Iec 62351 security standards for the power system information infrastructure. IEC TC57 WG15 Security Standards ver, 14, 2012.

[17]

K. R. Davis, C. M. Davis, S. A. Zonouz, R. B. Bobba, R. Berthier, L. Garcia, and P. W. Sauer. A cyber-physical modeling and assessment framework for power grid infrastructures. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on, 6(5):2464--2475, 2015.

[18]

B. Genge and C. Siaterlis. Developing cyber-physical experimental capabilities for the security analysis of the future smart grid. In Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT Europe), 2011 2nd IEEE PES International Conference and Exhibition on, pages 1--7. IEEE, 2011.

[19]

B. Genge, C. Siaterlis, and M. Hohenadel. Amici: An assessment platform for multi-domain security experimentation on critical infrastructures. In International Workshop on Critical Information Infrastructures Security, pages 228--239. Springer, 2012.

[20]

J. D. Glover, M. S. Sarma, and T. Overbye. Power system analysis and design. China Machine Press, 2004.

Digital Library

[21]

J. Hong, S. S. Wu, A. Stefanov, A. Fshosha, C. C. Liu, P. Gladyshev, and M. Govindarasu. An intrusion and defense testbed in a cyber-power system environment. In 2011 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, pages 1--5, July 2011.

[22]

IEC TC57. IEC 62351 Parts 1--8 - Information Security for Power System Control Operations. International Electro technical Commission Std, 2009.

[23]

IEC TC57. IEC 61850--90--2 TR: Communication networks and systems for power utility automation -- part 90-2: Using iec 61850 for the communication between substations and control centres. International Electro technical Commission Std, 2015.

[24]

IEEE Power Engineering Society. IEEE Standard Communication Delivery Time Performance Requirements for Electric Power Substation Automation.

[25]

B. Kang, P. Maynard, K. McLaughlin, S. Sezer, F. Andren, C. Seitl, F. Kupzog, and T. Strasser. Investigating cyber-physical attacks against iec 61850 photovoltaic inverter installations. In Emerging Technologies & Factory Automation (ETFA), 2015 IEEE 20th Conference on, pages 1--8. IEEE, 2015.

[26]

G. Koutsandria, R. Gentz, M. Jamei, A. Scaglione, S. Peisert, and C. McParland. A real-time testbed environment for cyber-physical security on the power grid. In Proceedings of the First ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems-Security and/or PrivaCy, pages 67--78. ACM, 2015.

Digital Library

[27]

H. Lin, A. Slagell, C. Di Martino, Z. Kalbarczyk, and R. K. Iyer. Adapting bro into scada: building a specification-based intrusion detection system for the dnp3 protocol. In Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop, page 5. ACM, 2013.

Digital Library

[28]

H. Lin, A. Slagell, Z. Kalbarczyk, P. Sauer, and R. Iyer. Runtime semantic security analysis to detect and mitigate control-related attacks in power grids. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on (to appear).

[29]

H. Lin, A. Slagell, Z. Kalbarczyk, P. W. Sauer, and R. K. Iyer. Semantic security analysis of scada networks to detect malicious control commands in power grids. In Proceedings of the first ACM workshop on Smart energy grid security, pages 29--34. ACM, 2013.

Digital Library

[30]

D. Mashima, P. Gunathilaka, and B. Chen. An active command mediation approach for securing remote control interface of substations. In Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2016 IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 2016.

[31]

P. Maynard, K. McLaughlin, and B. Haberler. Towards understanding man-in-the-middle attacks on iec 60870-5-104 scada networks. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2014, pages 30--42. BCS, 2014.

Digital Library

[32]

U. K. Premaratne, J. Samarabandu, T. S. Sidhu, R. Beresh, and J.-C. Tan. An intrusion detection system for iec61850 automated substations. Power Delivery, IEEE Transactions on, 25(4):2376--2383, 2010.

[33]

R. Schlegel, S. Obermeier, and J. Schneider. Assessing the security of iec 62351. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research, pages 11--19. British Computer Society, 2015.

Digital Library

[34]

C. Siaterlis, B. Genge, and M. Hohenadel. Epic: a testbed for scientifically rigorous cyber-physical security experimentation. IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, 1(2):319--330, 2013.

[35]

C.-C. Sun, J. Hong, and C.-C. Liu. A co-simulation environment for integrated cyber and power systems. In 2015 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), pages 133--138. IEEE, 2015.

[36]

R. Tan, H. H. Nguyen, E. Y. S. Foo, X. Dong, D. K. Y. Yau, Z. Kalbarczyk, R. K. Iyer, and H. B. Gooi. Optimal false data injection attack against automatic generation control in power grids. In 7th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems, 2016.

Digital Library

[37]

S. Tan, W.-Z. Song, Q. Dong, and L. Tong. Score: Smart-grid common open research emulator. In Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2012 IEEE Third International Conference on, pages 282--287. IEEE, 2012.

[38]

S. Tan, W.-Z. Song, S. Yothment, J. Yang, and L. Tong. Scoreplus: An integrated scalable cyber-physical experiment environment for smart grid. In Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON), 2015 12th Annual IEEE International Conference on, pages 381--389. IEEE, 2015.

[39]

C. Ten, J. Hong, and C. Liu. Anomaly detection for cybersecurity of the substations. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on, 2(4):865--873, 2011.

[40]

R. Udd, M. Asplund, S. Nadjm-Tehrani, M. Kazemtabrizi, and M. Ekstedt. Exploiting bro for intrusion detection in a scada system. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Workshop on Cyber-Physical System Security, pages 44--51. ACM, 2016.

Digital Library

[41]

D. Wei, Y. Lu, M. Jafari, P. M. Skare, and K. Rohde. Protecting smart grid automation systems against cyberattacks. Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on, 2(4):782--795, 2011.

[42]

J. M. Weiss. Control systems cyber security--the need for appropriate regulations to assure the cyber security of the electric grid. In US Congress Testimony, October, 2007.

[43]

B. White, J. Lepreau, L. Stoller, R. Ricci, S. Guruprasad, M. Newbold, M. Hibler, C. Barb, and A. Joglekar. An integrated experimental environment for distributed systems and networks. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review, 36(SI):255--270, 2002.

Digital Library

[44]

T. A. Youssef, A. T. Elsayed, and O. A. Mohammed. Dds based interoperability framework for smart grid testbed infrastructure. In Environment and Electrical Engineering (EEEIC), 2015 IEEE 15th International Conference on, pages 219--224, June 2015.

[45]

K. Zetter. Inside the cunning, unprecedented hack of ukraine's power grid. http://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/. {accessed on 7-Apr-2016}.

[46]

Y. Zhu, J. Yan, Y. Tang, Y. L. Sun, and H. He. Resilience analysis of power grids under the sequential attack. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, 9(12):2340--2354, 2014.

Digital Library

Cited By

Zhu HLiu MChen BChe XCheng PDeng R(2024) HoneyJudge : A PLC Honeypot Identification Framework Based on Device Memory Testing IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2024.340752019(6028-6043)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2024.3407520
Chng BNg BRoomi MMashima DLou X(2024)CRaaS: Cloud-based Smart Grid Cyber Range for Scalable Cybersecurity Experiments and Training2024 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)10.1109/SmartGridComm60555.2024.10738051(333-339)Online publication date: 17-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm60555.2024.10738051
Efiong JAkinwale AAkinyemi BOlajubu EAderounmu S(2024)CyberGrid: an IEC61850 protocol-based substation automation virtual cyber range for cybersecurity research in the smart gridCyber-Physical Systems10.1080/23335777.2024.2350004(1-20)Online publication date: 3-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1080/23335777.2024.2350004
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

SoftGrid: A Software-based Smart Grid Testbed for Evaluating Substation Cybersecurity Solutions

Recommendations

Cyber-risk identification for a digital substation
ARES '20: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

Power grids are rapidly evolving through digital transformation by adopting information and communication technologies. This evolution is creating concerns for electricity transmission and distribution companies to maintain security and reliability of ...
The AI-Based Cyber Threat Landscape: A Survey

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have induced tremendous growth in innovation and automation. Although these AI technologies offer significant benefits, they can be used maliciously. Highly targeted and evasive attacks in ...
A quantum-based approach for offensive security against cyber attacks in electrical infrastructure
Abstract
Deciding the correct offensive security strategy for safeguarding the electrical physical infrastructures of smart grids is a challenging task. The offensive security training against various cyber-attacks focuses on a multitude of ...
Highlights
- In this research investigation, a formal modeling of security strategy is proposed using Lambda calculus with both classical and quantum perspectives.

Comments

Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

CPS-SPC '16: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy

October 2016

144 pages

ISBN:9781450345682

DOI:10.1145/2994487

Conference Chairs:
Mathias Payer
Purdue University, USA
,
Stefan Mangard
IAIK TU Graz, Austria
,
General Chairs:
Edgar Weippl
SBA Research, Austria
,
Stefan Katzenbeisser
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany
,
Program Chairs:
Alvaro Cárdenas
UT Dallas, USA
,
Rakesh B. Bobba
Oregon State University, USA

Copyright © 2016 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

Sponsors

SIGSAC: ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control

Publisher

Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 28 October 2016

Permissions

Request permissions for this article.

Request Permissions

Check for updates

Author Tags

Qualifiers

Research-article

Funding Sources

Conference

CCS'16

Sponsor:

SIGSAC

CCS'16: 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 28, 2016

Vienna, Austria

Acceptance Rates

CPS-SPC '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 12 of 26 submissions, 46%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 53 of 66 submissions, 80%

Upcoming Conference

CCS '25

Sponsor:
sigsac

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

October 13 - 17, 2025

Taipei , Taiwan

Contributors

Other Metrics

View Article Metrics

Bibliometrics & Citations

Bibliometrics

Article Metrics

34
Total Citations
View Citations
501
Total Downloads

Downloads (Last 12 months)33
Downloads (Last 6 weeks)1

Reflects downloads up to 22 Dec 2024

Other Metrics

View Author Metrics

Citations

Cited By

Zhu HLiu MChen BChe XCheng PDeng R(2024) HoneyJudge : A PLC Honeypot Identification Framework Based on Device Memory Testing IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security10.1109/TIFS.2024.340752019(6028-6043)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2024.3407520
Chng BNg BRoomi MMashima DLou X(2024)CRaaS: Cloud-based Smart Grid Cyber Range for Scalable Cybersecurity Experiments and Training2024 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)10.1109/SmartGridComm60555.2024.10738051(333-339)Online publication date: 17-Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm60555.2024.10738051
Efiong JAkinwale AAkinyemi BOlajubu EAderounmu S(2024)CyberGrid: an IEC61850 protocol-based substation automation virtual cyber range for cybersecurity research in the smart gridCyber-Physical Systems10.1080/23335777.2024.2350004(1-20)Online publication date: 3-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1080/23335777.2024.2350004
Aslam MLi WLiu WQi YSaleem URiaz S(2024)A review of integrated modeling and simulation of control and communication systems in Smart GridComputers and Electrical Engineering10.1016/j.compeleceng.2024.109553119:PAOnline publication date: 1-Oct-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.compeleceng.2024.109553
Esiner ETefek UMashima DChen BKalbarczyk ZNicol D(2023)Message Authentication and Provenance Verification for Industrial Control SystemsACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems10.1145/36071947:4(1-28)Online publication date: 14-Oct-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3607194
Roomi MHwee IMashima D(2023)On Design and Implementation of Real-time, High-fidelity Virtual Power System for Smart Grid Cyber Range2023 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)10.1109/SmartGridComm57358.2023.10333893(1-7)Online publication date: 31-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm57358.2023.10333893
Roomi MHussain SMashima DChang EUstun T(2023)Analysis of False Data Injection Attacks Against Automated Control for Parallel Generators in IEC 61850-Based Smart Grid SystemsIEEE Systems Journal10.1109/JSYST.2023.323695117:3(4603-4614)Online publication date: Sep-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/JSYST.2023.3236951
Mashima DRoomi MNg BKalberczyk ZSuhail Hussain SChang E(2023)Towards Automated Generation of Smart Grid Cyber Range for Cybersecurity Experiments and Training2023 53rd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks - Supplemental Volume (DSN-S)10.1109/DSN-S58398.2023.00024(49-55)Online publication date: Jun-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN-S58398.2023.00024
Shi LKrishnan SWen S(2022)Study Cybersecurity of Cyber Physical System in the Virtual Environment: A Survey and New DirectionProceedings of the 2022 Australasian Computer Science Week10.1145/3511616.3513098(46-55)Online publication date: 14-Feb-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3511616.3513098
Teo JGunawan SBiswas PMashima D(2022)Evaluating Synthetic Datasets for Training Machine Learning Models to Detect Malicious Commands2022 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)10.1109/SmartGridComm52983.2022.9961001(315-321)Online publication date: 25-Oct-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/SmartGridComm52983.2022.9961001
Show More Cited By

View Options

Login options

Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.

Full Access

Get this Publication

View options

PDF

View or Download as a PDF file.

eReader

View online with eReader.

Media

Figures

Other

Tables

View Table of Contents