abstract

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The FedEx Problem

Authors:

Amos Fiat,

Kira Goldner,

Anna R. Karlin,

Elias KoutsoupiasAuthors Info & Claims

EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Pages 21 - 22

https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940752

Published: 21 July 2016 Publication History

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Abstract

Consider the pricing problem faced by FedEx. Each customer has a package to ship, a deadline $d$ by which he needs his package to arrive, and a value $v$ for a guarantee that the package will arrive by his deadline. FedEx can (and does) offer a number of different shipping options in order to extract more revenue from their customers. In this paper, we solve the optimal (revenue-maximizing) auction problem for the single-agent version of this problem. Our paper adds to the relatively short list of multi-parameter settings for which a closed-form solution is known.

Reference

[1]

Roger B. Myerson. 1981. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 1 (1981), 58--73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58

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Ko SMunagala K(2024)Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized MechanismsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/365010712:2(1-37)Online publication date: 5-Mar-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3650107
Kiayias AKoutsoupias ELazos PPanagiotakos G(2024)Tiered Mechanisms for Blockchain Transaction FeesMathematical Research for Blockchain Economy10.1007/978-3-031-68974-1_1(1-26)Online publication date: 4-Dec-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68974-1_1
Alaei SChawla SMakhdoumi AMalekian A(2023)Countering Value Uncertainty via Refunds: A Mechanism Design ApproachSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4561235Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4561235
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Index Terms

The FedEx Problem
1. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic mechanism design
      2. Computational pricing and auctions

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

EC '16: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 2016

874 pages

ISBN:9781450339360

DOI:10.1145/2940716

General Chair:
Vincent Conitzer
Duke University, USA
,
Program Chairs:
Dirk Bergemann
Yale University, USA
,
Yiling Chen
Harvard University, USA

Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 21 July 2016

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EC '16

Sponsor:

SIGecom

EC '16: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 24 - 28, 2016

Maastricht, The Netherlands

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EC '16 Paper Acceptance Rate 80 of 242 submissions, 33%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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EC '25

Sponsor:
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The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

July 7 - 11, 2025

Stanford , CA , USA

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Cited By

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Ko SMunagala K(2024)Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized MechanismsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/365010712:2(1-37)Online publication date: 5-Mar-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3650107
Kiayias AKoutsoupias ELazos PPanagiotakos G(2024)Tiered Mechanisms for Blockchain Transaction FeesMathematical Research for Blockchain Economy10.1007/978-3-031-68974-1_1(1-26)Online publication date: 4-Dec-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68974-1_1
Alaei SChawla SMakhdoumi AMalekian A(2023)Countering Value Uncertainty via Refunds: A Mechanism Design ApproachSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4561235Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4561235
Malik KParamahamsa K(2023)Selling two complementary goodsInternational Journal of Game Theory10.1007/s00182-023-00879-853:2(423-447)Online publication date: 7-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-023-00879-8
Lv HBei XZheng ZWu F(2023)Auction Design for Bidders with Ex Post ROI ConstraintsWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_28(492-508)Online publication date: 31-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_28
Aggarwal GBhawalkar KMehta AMohan DPsomas AKoyejo SMohamed SAgarwal ABelgrave DCho KOh A(2022)Simple mechanisms for welfare maximization in rich advertising auctionsProceedings of the 36th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3600270.3602320(28280-28292)Online publication date: 28-Nov-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3600270.3602320
Chawla SRezvan RTeng YTzamos CLeonardi SGupta A(2022)Pricing ordered itemsProceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3519935.3520065(722-735)Online publication date: 9-Jun-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3519935.3520065
Ko SMunagala KPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized MechanismsProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538335(477-496)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538335
Weinberg SZhou ZPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-ImplementableProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538334(875-896)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538334
Bergemann DCai YVelegkas GZhao MPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal?Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538304(608-663)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538304
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