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A Look at the Consequences of Internet Censorship Through an ISP Lens

Authors:

Sheharbano Khattak,

Syed Ali Khayam,

Zartash Afzal Uzmi,

Vern PaxsonAuthors Info & Claims

IMC '14: Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference

Pages 271 - 284

https://doi.org/10.1145/2663716.2663750

Published: 05 November 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Internet censorship artificially changes the dynamics of resource production and consumption, affecting a range of stakeholders that include end users, service providers, and content providers. We analyze two large-scale censorship events in Pakistan: blocking of pornographic content in 2011 and of YouTube in 2012. Using traffic datasets collected at home and SOHO networks before and after the censorship events, we: a) quantify the demand for blocked content, b) illuminate challenges encountered by service providers in implementing the censorship policies, c) investigate changes in user behavior (e.g., with respect to circumvention) after censorship, and d) assess benefits extracted by competing content providers of blocked content.

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Cited By

Bhaskar APearce PLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)Understanding Routing-Induced Censorship Changes GloballyProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3670336(437-451)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3670336
Rahman MDiAdamo SMehic MFleming C(2024)Quantum Secure Anonymous Communication Networks2024 International Conference on Quantum Communications, Networking, and Computing (QCNC)10.1109/QCNC62729.2024.00060(346-351)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/QCNC62729.2024.00060
Seraj SKhodambashi SPavlidis MPolatidis N(2023)MVDroid: an android malicious VPN detector using neural networksNeural Computing and Applications10.1007/s00521-023-08512-135:29(21555-21565)Online publication date: 3-Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-023-08512-1
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

A Look at the Consequences of Internet Censorship Through an ISP Lens
1. Networks
  1. Network services
    1. Network monitoring

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

IMC '14: Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference

November 2014

524 pages

ISBN:9781450332132

DOI:10.1145/2663716

General Chair:
Carey Williamson
University of Calgary, Canada
,
Program Chairs:
Aditya Akella
University of Wisconsin - Madison, USA
,
Nina Taft
Google, USA

Copyright © 2014 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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SIGMETRICS: ACM Special Interest Group on Measurement and Evaluation
SIGCOMM: ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication
USENIX Assoc: USENIX Assoc

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 05 November 2014

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IMC '14

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SIGMETRICS
SIGCOMM
USENIX Assoc

IMC '14: Internet Measurement Conference

November 5 - 7, 2014

BC, Vancouver, Canada

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IMC '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 32 of 103 submissions, 31%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 277 of 1,083 submissions, 26%

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Cited By

Bhaskar APearce PLuo BLiao XXu JKirda ELie D(2024)Understanding Routing-Induced Censorship Changes GloballyProceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3658644.3670336(437-451)Online publication date: 2-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3658644.3670336
Rahman MDiAdamo SMehic MFleming C(2024)Quantum Secure Anonymous Communication Networks2024 International Conference on Quantum Communications, Networking, and Computing (QCNC)10.1109/QCNC62729.2024.00060(346-351)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/QCNC62729.2024.00060
Seraj SKhodambashi SPavlidis MPolatidis N(2023)MVDroid: an android malicious VPN detector using neural networksNeural Computing and Applications10.1007/s00521-023-08512-135:29(21555-21565)Online publication date: 3-Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00521-023-08512-1
Jin LHao SWang HCotton C(2022)Understanding the Practices of Global Censorship through Accurate, End-to-End MeasurementsACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review10.1145/3547353.352264050:1(17-18)Online publication date: 7-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3547353.3522640
Jin LHao SWang HCotton CManjunath DNair JCarlsson NCohen ERobert P(2022)Understanding the Practices of Global Censorship through Accurate, End-to-End MeasurementsAbstract Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGMETRICS/IFIP PERFORMANCE Joint International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems10.1145/3489048.3522640(17-18)Online publication date: 6-Jun-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3489048.3522640
Heijligenberg TLkhaouni OKohls K(2022)Leaky Blinders: Information Leakage in Mobile VPNsApplied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops10.1007/978-3-031-16815-4_26(481-494)Online publication date: 24-Sep-2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16815-4_26
Jin LHao SWang HCotton C(2021)Understanding the Practices of Global Censorship through Accurate, End-to-End MeasurementsProceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems10.1145/34910555:3(1-25)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3491055
Singh KGrover GBansal V(2020)How India Censors the WebProceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Web Science10.1145/3394231.3397891(21-28)Online publication date: 6-Jul-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3394231.3397891
Dogar FQazi ITariq AMurtaza GAhmad AStocking NBernhaupt RMueller FVerweij DAndres JMcGrenere JCockburn AAvellino IGoguey ABjørn PZhao SSamson BKocielnik R(2020)MissIt: Using Missed Calls for Free, Extremely Low Bit-Rate Communication in Developing RegionsProceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems10.1145/3313831.3376259(1-12)Online publication date: 21-Apr-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3313831.3376259
Niaki ACho SWeinberg ZHoang NRazaghpanah AChristin NGill P(2020)ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)10.1109/SP40000.2020.00014(135-151)Online publication date: May-2020
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40000.2020.00014
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