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On the Challenges of Effective Movement

Published: 03 November 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Moving Target (MT) defenses have been proposed as a game-changing approach to rebalance the security landscape in favor of the defender. MT techniques make systems less deterministic, less static, and less homogeneous in order to increase the level of effort required to achieve a successful compromise. However, a number of challenges in achieving effective movement lead to weaknesses in MT techniques that can often be used by the attackers to bypass or otherwise nullify the impact of that movement. In this paper, we propose that these challenges can be grouped into three main types: coverage, unpredictability, and timeliness. We provide a description of these challenges and study how they impact prominent MT techniques. We also discuss a number of other considerations faced when designing and deploying MT defenses.

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Cited By

View all
  • (2022)A Survey on Moving Target Defense for Networks: A Practical ViewElectronics10.3390/electronics1118288611:18(2886)Online publication date: 12-Sep-2022
  • (2022)Evaluating the Security and Economic Effects of Moving Target Defense Techniques on the CloudIEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing10.1109/TETC.2022.315527210:4(1772-1788)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2022
  • (2022)Dynamic defenses in cyber security: Techniques, methods and challengesDigital Communications and Networks10.1016/j.dcan.2021.07.0068:4(422-435)Online publication date: Aug-2022
  • Show More Cited By

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    MTD '14: Proceedings of the First ACM Workshop on Moving Target Defense
    November 2014
    116 pages
    ISBN:9781450331500
    DOI:10.1145/2663474
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    Publication History

    Published: 03 November 2014

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    Author Tags

    1. cybersecurity challenges
    2. diversity
    3. metrics
    4. moving target
    5. randomization

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    Acceptance Rates

    MTD '14 Paper Acceptance Rate 9 of 16 submissions, 56%;
    Overall Acceptance Rate 40 of 92 submissions, 43%

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    Cited By

    View all
    • (2022)A Survey on Moving Target Defense for Networks: A Practical ViewElectronics10.3390/electronics1118288611:18(2886)Online publication date: 12-Sep-2022
    • (2022)Evaluating the Security and Economic Effects of Moving Target Defense Techniques on the CloudIEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing10.1109/TETC.2022.315527210:4(1772-1788)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2022
    • (2022)Dynamic defenses in cyber security: Techniques, methods and challengesDigital Communications and Networks10.1016/j.dcan.2021.07.0068:4(422-435)Online publication date: Aug-2022
    • (2021)MTD, Where Art Thou? A Systematic Review of Moving Target Defense Techniques for IoTIEEE Internet of Things Journal10.1109/JIOT.2020.30403588:10(7818-7832)Online publication date: 15-May-2021
    • (2021)Lightweight Proactive Moving-target Defense for Secure Data Exchange in IoT Networks2021 IEEE 12th Annual Information Technology, Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (IEMCON)10.1109/IEMCON53756.2021.9623218(0317-0322)Online publication date: 27-Oct-2021
    • (2021)An Optimal Seed Scheduling Strategy Algorithm Applied to Cyberspace Mimic DefenseIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2021.31117359(129032-129050)Online publication date: 2021
    • (2020)WGT: Thwarting Web Attacks Through Web Gene Tree-based Moving Target Defense2020 IEEE International Conference on Web Services (ICWS)10.1109/ICWS49710.2020.00054(364-371)Online publication date: Oct-2020
    • (2020)A Novel Model of Mimic Defense Based on Minimal L-Order Error ProbabilityIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2020.30248478(180481-180490)Online publication date: 2020
    • (2020)Scheduling Sequence Control Method Based on Sliding Window in Cyberspace Mimic DefenseIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2019.29616448(1517-1533)Online publication date: 2020
    • (2019)DSEOM: A Framework for Dynamic Security Evaluation and Optimization of MTD in Container-based CloudIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing10.1109/TDSC.2019.2916666(1-1)Online publication date: 2019
    • Show More Cited By

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