[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ skip to main content
research-article

Resolvers Revealed: Characterizing DNS Resolvers and their Clients

Published: 01 July 2013 Publication History

Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS) allows clients to use resolvers, sometimes called caches, to query a set of authoritative servers to translate host names into IP addresses. Prior work has proposed using the interaction between these DNS resolvers and the authoritative servers as an access control mechanism. However, while prior work has examined the DNS from many angles, the resolver component has received little scrutiny. Essential factors for using a resolver in an access control system, such as whether a resolver is part of an ISP’s infrastructure or running on an end-user’s system, have not been examined. In this study, we examine DNS resolver behavior and usage, from query patterns and reactions to nonstandard responses to passive association techniques to pair resolvers with their client hosts. In doing so, we discover evidence of security protocol support, misconfigured resolvers, techniques to fingerprint resolvers, and features for detecting automated clients. These measurements can influence the implementation and design of these resolvers and DNS-based access control systems.

References

[1]
Ager, B., Muhlbauer, W., Smaragdakis, G., and Uhlig, S. 2010. Comparing dns resolvers in the wild. In Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference.
[2]
Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and Rose, S. 2005. Protocol modifications for the dns security extensions. IETF rfc 4035. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4035.
[3]
ARIN. 2010. ASN listing. https://www.arin.net/.
[4]
Choi, H., Lee, H., Lee, H., and Kim, H. 2007. Botnet detection by monitoring group activities in dns traffic. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer and Information Technology. 715--720.
[5]
Cohen, E. and Kaplan, H. 2003. Proactive caching of dns records: Addressing a performance bottleneck. Comput. Netw. 41, 6, 707--726.
[6]
Dagon, D., Provos, N., Lee, C., and Lee, W. 2008. Corrupted dns resolution paths: The rise of a malicious resolution authority. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium.
[7]
Dietrich, C. J., Rossow, C., Freiling, F. C., Bos, H., Van Steen, M., and Pohlmann, N. 2011. On botnets that use dns for command and control. In Proceedings of the 7th European Conference on Computer Network Defense (EC2ND’11).
[8]
Google. 2011. Google public dns. http://code.google.com/speed/public-dns/.
[9]
Grier, C., Ballard, L., Caballero, J., Chachra, N., Dietrich, C. J., Levchenko, K., Mavrommatis, P., Mccoy, D., Nappa, A., Pitsillidis, A., et al. 2012. Manufacturing compromise: The emergence of exploit-as-a-service. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM Press, New York, 821--832.
[10]
Jung, J., Sit, E., Balakrishnan, H., and Morris, R. 2002. DNS performance and the effectiveness of caching. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 10, 5, 589--603.
[11]
Kalafut, A., Shue, C., and Gupta, M. 2011. Touring dns open houses for trends and configurations. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 19, 6, 1666--1675.
[12]
Mao, Z. M., Cranor, C. D., Douglis, F., Rabinovich, M., Spatscheck, O., and Wang, J. 2002. A precise and efficient evaluation of the proximity between web clients and their local dns servers. In Proceedings of the General Track of the Annual Conference at the USENIX Annual Technical Conference.
[13]
Mockapetris, P. 1987. Domain implementation and specification. IETF rfc 1035. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035.
[14]
Oberheide, J., Karir, M., and Mao, Z. 2007. Characterizing dark dns behavior. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. 140--156.
[15]
OpenDNS. 2011. OpenDNS. http://www.opendns.com/.
[16]
Pappas, V., Wessels, D., Massey, D., Lu, S., Terzis, A., and Zhang, L. 2009. Impact of configuration errors on dns robustness. IEEE J. Select. Areas Comm. 27, 3, 275--290.
[17]
Ramachandran, A. and Feamster, N. 2006. Understanding the network-level behavior of spammers. In Proceedings of the Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications. ACM Press, New York, 291--302.
[18]
Shue, C., Kalafut, A., and Gupta, M. 2007. The web is smaller than it seems. In Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference.
[19]
Shue, C. A., Kalafut, A. J., Allman, M., and Taylor, C. R. 2012. On building inexpensive network capabilities. ACM SIGCOMM Comput. Comm. Rev. 42, 2, 72--79.
[20]
Sisson, G. 2010. DNS survey: October 2010. Tech. rep., The Measurement Factory. http://dns.measurement-factory.com/surveys/201010/.
[21]
Spamhaus Project. 2010a. Exploits block list (xbl). http://www.spamhaus.org/xbl/index.lasso.
[22]
Spamhaus Project. 2010b. Spamhaus block list (SBL). http://www.spamhaus.org/sbl/index.lasso.
[23]
University of Oregon Advanced Network Technology Center. 2010. Route views project. http://www.routeviews.org/.
[24]
Vixie, P. 1999. Extension mechanisms for dns (edns0). IETF rfc 2671. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2671.txt.
[25]
Von Ahn, L., Blum, M., Hopper, N., and Langford, J. 2003. Captcha: Using hard ai problems for security. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic (EUROCRYPT’03). 646--646.
[26]
Zdrnja, B., Brownlee, N., and Wessels, D. 2007. Passive monitoring of dns anomalies. In Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. Springer, 129--139.

Cited By

View all
  • (2023)The Closed Resolver Project: Measuring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address ValidationIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2023.325741331:6(2589-2603)Online publication date: Dec-2023
  • (2023)Network architecture and ROA protection of government mail domains: A case studyComputer Communications10.1016/j.comcom.2023.02.004201(143-161)Online publication date: Mar-2023
  • (2022)Local and Public DNS Resolvers: do you trade off performance against security?2022 IFIP Networking Conference (IFIP Networking)10.23919/IFIPNetworking55013.2022.9829756(1-9)Online publication date: 13-Jun-2022
  • Show More Cited By

Index Terms

  1. Resolvers Revealed: Characterizing DNS Resolvers and their Clients

    Recommendations

    Comments

    Please enable JavaScript to view thecomments powered by Disqus.

    Information & Contributors

    Information

    Published In

    cover image ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
    ACM Transactions on Internet Technology  Volume 12, Issue 4
    July 2013
    64 pages
    ISSN:1533-5399
    EISSN:1557-6051
    DOI:10.1145/2499926
    Issue’s Table of Contents
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

    Publisher

    Association for Computing Machinery

    New York, NY, United States

    Publication History

    Published: 01 July 2013
    Accepted: 01 May 2013
    Revised: 01 February 2013
    Received: 01 March 2012
    Published in TOIT Volume 12, Issue 4

    Permissions

    Request permissions for this article.

    Check for updates

    Author Tags

    1. DNS resolvers
    2. security

    Qualifiers

    • Research-article
    • Research
    • Refereed

    Contributors

    Other Metrics

    Bibliometrics & Citations

    Bibliometrics

    Article Metrics

    • Downloads (Last 12 months)17
    • Downloads (Last 6 weeks)1
    Reflects downloads up to 02 Mar 2025

    Other Metrics

    Citations

    Cited By

    View all
    • (2023)The Closed Resolver Project: Measuring the Deployment of Inbound Source Address ValidationIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2023.325741331:6(2589-2603)Online publication date: Dec-2023
    • (2023)Network architecture and ROA protection of government mail domains: A case studyComputer Communications10.1016/j.comcom.2023.02.004201(143-161)Online publication date: Mar-2023
    • (2022)Local and Public DNS Resolvers: do you trade off performance against security?2022 IFIP Networking Conference (IFIP Networking)10.23919/IFIPNetworking55013.2022.9829756(1-9)Online publication date: 13-Jun-2022
    • (2022)Detecting DNS hijacking by using NetFlow data2022 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)10.1109/CNS56114.2022.9947264(273-280)Online publication date: 3-Oct-2022
    • (2020)Black-box caches fingerprintingProceedings of the 16th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies10.1145/3386367.3432148(564-565)Online publication date: 23-Nov-2020
    • (2020)Don’t Forget to Lock the Front Door! Inferring the Deployment of Source Address Validation of Inbound TrafficPassive and Active Measurement10.1007/978-3-030-44081-7_7(107-121)Online publication date: 18-Mar-2020
    • (2018)Reducing DNSSEC Packet Size using Memorization in SDN environment2018 International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communications and Informatics (ICACCI)10.1109/ICACCI.2018.8554638(2259-2263)Online publication date: Sep-2018
    • (2018)Measuring IPv6 DNS Reconnaissance Attacks and Preventing Them Using DNS Guard2018 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN)10.1109/DSN.2018.00045(350-361)Online publication date: Jun-2018
    • (2018)DNS Unchained: Amplified Application-Layer DoS Attacks Against DNS AuthoritativesResearch in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses10.1007/978-3-030-00470-5_7(139-160)Online publication date: 7-Sep-2018
    • (2017)POSTERProceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3133956.3138821(2519-2521)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2017
    • Show More Cited By

    View Options

    Login options

    Full Access

    View options

    PDF

    View or Download as a PDF file.

    PDF

    eReader

    View online with eReader.

    eReader

    Figures

    Tables

    Media

    Share

    Share

    Share this Publication link

    Share on social media