research-article

Waiting-line auction for WiFi pricing

Authors:

Tao Han,

Liang Ma,

Yuan'an LiuAuthors Info & Claims

CoNEXT '08: Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference

Article No.: 56, Pages 1 - 2

https://doi.org/10.1145/1544012.1544068

Published: 09 December 2008 Publication History

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Abstract

We model the relationship between a WLAN access point (AP) and a paying mobile station (MS) as a waiting-line auction [1] in which clients bids for transmission using the length of Contention Window (CW) as bid signals. The shorter CW is, the higher the access probability is, thus the higher pay to AP. The clients adapt their CWs based on the information acquired from current service load and wireless environment. Clients could achieve equilibrium bids according to Nash Equilibrium strategy.

References

[1]

Charles A. Holt and R. Sherman. Waiting line auction. The Journal of Political Economy, 90: 280--294, April 1982.

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[2]

J. Musacchio and J. Walrand. Wifi access point pricing as a dynamic game. Networking, IEEE/ACM Transaction on, 14(2): 289--301, 2006.

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[3]

Rivest and A. Shamir. Payword and micromint: Two simple micropayment schemes. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1189: 69--87, 1997.

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Index Terms

Waiting-line auction for WiFi pricing
1. Hardware
  1. Communication hardware, interfaces and storage
2. Networks
  1. Network types
    1. Mobile networks
    2. Wireless access networks

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

CoNEXT '08: Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference

December 2008

526 pages

ISBN:9781605582108

DOI:10.1145/1544012

Conference Chairs:
Arturo Azcorra
IMDEA Networks and University Carlos III of Madrid, Spain
,
Gustavo de Veciana
University Texas at Austin
,
Program Chairs:
Keith W. Ross
Polytechnic University
,
Leandros Tassiulas
University of Thessaly, Greece

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 09 December 2008

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