Article

First price sealed bid auction without auctioneers

Authors:

Shuo Zheng,

Luke McAven,

Yi MuAuthors Info & Claims

IWCMC '07: Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing

Pages 127 - 131

https://doi.org/10.1145/1280940.1280967

Published: 12 August 2007 Publication History

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Abstract

We propose two protocol variants for a first price sealed-bid auction, without using intermediatory auctioneers. One version achieves full privacy for the bidders and their bids, the other provides a form of verifiability, at the cost of some privacy. Full privacy protects all bids. In particular the winner's identity and price are only known by the seller. Lesser privacy allows the winner to be known and verified publicly. Both versions provide non-repudiation. We demonstrate correctness and show how computational and communication costs vary with different privacy levels.

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Cited By

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Darzanos GPapaioannou TStamoulis G(2024)Efficient and Budget-Balanced Decentralized Management of Federated Cloud and Edge Providers2024 IEEE 24th International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Internet Computing (CCGrid)10.1109/CCGrid59990.2024.00050(374-384)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/CCGrid59990.2024.00050
Papaioannou TMantzonis DRitas V(2024)Towards a Blockchain-Enabled Trustworthy Market Framework2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)10.1109/Blockchain62396.2024.00096(656-662)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain62396.2024.00096
Yadav ABaranwal G(2023)A Study on Privacy-Preserving Auctions Considering Possible Collusions2023 IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)10.1109/ICCST59048.2023.10474239(1-6)Online publication date: 11-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCST59048.2023.10474239
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Index Terms

First price sealed bid auction without auctioneers
1. Applied computing
  1. Electronic commerce
    1. E-commerce infrastructure
  2. Enterprise computing
    1. Business process management

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Published In

IWCMC '07: Proceedings of the 2007 international conference on Wireless communications and mobile computing

August 2007

716 pages

ISBN:9781595936950

DOI:10.1145/1280940

General Chairs:
Mohsen Guizani
Western Michigan University, USA
,
Hsiao-Hwa Chen
National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan
,
Program Chair:
Xi Zhang
Texas A&M University, USA

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 12 August 2007

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Conference

IWCMC07

Sponsor:

SIGDOC
ACM

IWCMC07: International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference

August 12 - 16, 2007

Hawaii, Honolulu, USA

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Cited By

View all

Darzanos GPapaioannou TStamoulis G(2024)Efficient and Budget-Balanced Decentralized Management of Federated Cloud and Edge Providers2024 IEEE 24th International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Internet Computing (CCGrid)10.1109/CCGrid59990.2024.00050(374-384)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/CCGrid59990.2024.00050
Papaioannou TMantzonis DRitas V(2024)Towards a Blockchain-Enabled Trustworthy Market Framework2024 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain)10.1109/Blockchain62396.2024.00096(656-662)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/Blockchain62396.2024.00096
Yadav ABaranwal G(2023)A Study on Privacy-Preserving Auctions Considering Possible Collusions2023 IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology (ICCST)10.1109/ICCST59048.2023.10474239(1-6)Online publication date: 11-Oct-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCST59048.2023.10474239
Zhang QYu YLi HYu JWang L(2023)Trustworthy Sealed-bid Auction with Low Communication Cost atop BlockchainInformation Sciences10.1016/j.ins.2023.02.069Online publication date: Feb-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2023.02.069
Macedo EBattisti AVieira JNoce JPires PMuchaluat-Saade DOliveira ADelicato F(2023)Distributed Auction-Based SFC Placement in a Multi-domain 5G EnvironmentSN Computer Science10.1007/s42979-023-02291-15:1Online publication date: 2-Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-023-02291-1
Chen BLi XXiang TWang P(2022)SBRAC: Blockchain-based sealed-bid auction with bidding price privacy and public verifiabilityJournal of Information Security and Applications10.1016/j.jisa.2021.10308265(103082)Online publication date: Mar-2022
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jisa.2021.103082
Dimitriou TKrontiris I(2018)Privacy-respecting auctions and rewarding mechanisms in mobile crowd-sensing applicationsJournal of Network and Computer Applications10.1016/j.jnca.2017.10.012100:C(24-34)Online publication date: 28-Dec-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.jnca.2017.10.012

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