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A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks

Authors:

Richard T. B. Ma,

John C. S. Lui,

David K. Y. YauAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, Volume 32, Issue 1

Pages 189 - 198

https://doi.org/10.1145/1012888.1005711

Published: 01 June 2004 Publication History

Abstract

Traditional peer-to-peer (P2P) networks do not provide service differentiation and incentive for users. Consequently, users can obtain services without themselves contributing any information or service to a P2P community. This leads to the "free-riding" and "tragedy of the commons" problems, in which the majority of information requests are directed towards a small number of P2P nodes willing to share their resources. The objective of this work is to enable service differentiation in a P2P network based on the amount of services each node has provided to its community, thereby encouraging all network nodes to share resources. We first introduce a resource distribution mechanism between all information sharing nodes. The mechanism is driven by a distributed algorithm which has linear time complexity and guarantees Pareto-optimal resource allocation. Besides giving incentive, the mechanism distributes resources in a way that increases the aggregate utility of the whole network. Second, we model the whole resource request and distribution process as a competition game between the competing nodes. We show that this game has a Nash equilibrium and is collusion-proof. To realize the game, we propose a protocol in which all competing nodes interact with the information providing node to reach Nash equilibrium in a dynamic and efficient manner. Experimental results are reported to illustrate that the protocol achieves its service differentiation objective and can induce productive information sharing by rational network nodes. Finally, we show that our protocol can properly adapt to different node arrival and departure events, and to different forms of network congestion.

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Cai FPan HSi XWu ZQian H(2022)Incentive Scheme for Shared Parking Space based on NFT2022 2nd International Conference on Computer Science and Blockchain (CCSB)10.1109/CCSB58128.2022.00012(26-33)Online publication date: Oct-2022
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Awuor FWang CTsai T(2018)Motivating Content Sharing and Trustworthiness in Mobile Social NetworksIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2018.28343596(28339-28355)Online publication date: 2018
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2834359
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A game theoretic approach to provide incentive and service differentiation in P2P networks

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Reviews

Reviewer: Takeshi Takahashi

Thanks to the massive development of peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies, we can easily exchange files among many users by using specific applications such as Gnutella. The P2P file-sharing system depends on users' willingness to share their files. Currently, however, only a small number of P2P users are willing to share their resources. This paper describes a scheme-RBM-IU-that provides people with incentives to share their own resources. RBM-IU allows users with higher contribution values to gain more priority and resources. RBM-IU considers the contribution values, as well as user satisfaction. Contribution values come from how many resources a user has shared, while user satisfaction values come from the percentage of a user's bandwidth requests (bidding) that are fulfilled. This paper also describes how to determine the bidding value based on game theory. Both theoretical issues and practical issues are discussed. The simulation experiments are very clear; you can see how many resources each user receives, based on the RBM-IU algorithm. If you are thinking about providing differentiated quality of service for each user, this paper will give you a lot to think about. For instance, the author's proposed RBM-IU algorithm maximizes the total sum of satisfaction value. Is it always the best solution__?__ Sometimes, it is also nice to have balanced satisfaction values among users, depending on the objectives and applications. Online Computing Reviews Service

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

cover image ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review

ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review Volume 32, Issue 1

June 2004

432 pages

ISSN:0163-5999

DOI:10.1145/1012888

Issue’s Table of Contents

SIGMETRICS '04/Performance '04: Proceedings of the joint international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
June 2004
450 pages
ISBN:1581138733
DOI:10.1145/1005686
General Chair:
E. G. Coffman
Columbia University
,
Program Chairs:
Zhen Liu
IBM Research
,
Arif Merchant
HP Labs

Copyright © 2004 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 June 2004

Published in SIGMETRICS Volume 32, Issue 1

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Sun ZTavakoli SKhalilpour KVoinov AMarshall J(2024)Barriers to Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Networks: A Multi-Dimensional PESTLE AnalysisSustainability10.3390/su1604151716:4(1517)Online publication date: 10-Feb-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/su16041517
Cai FPan HSi XWu ZQian H(2022)Incentive Scheme for Shared Parking Space based on NFT2022 2nd International Conference on Computer Science and Blockchain (CCSB)10.1109/CCSB58128.2022.00012(26-33)Online publication date: Oct-2022
https://doi.org/10.1109/CCSB58128.2022.00012
Awuor FWang CTsai T(2018)Motivating Content Sharing and Trustworthiness in Mobile Social NetworksIEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2018.28343596(28339-28355)Online publication date: 2018
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2834359
Antal EVinkó T(2017)Modeling max---min fair bandwidth allocation in BitTorrent communitiesComputational Optimization and Applications10.1007/s10589-016-9866-566:2(383-400)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10589-016-9866-5
Siwe ATembine H(2016)Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach2016 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals & Devices (SSD)10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659(601-606)Online publication date: Mar-2016
https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659
Shi WZhang LWu CLi ZLau F(2014)An online auction framework for dynamic resource provisioning in cloud computingACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review10.1145/2637364.259198042:1(71-83)Online publication date: 16-Jun-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2637364.2591980
Shi WZhang LWu CLi ZLau FSanghavi SShakkottai SLelarge MSchroeder B(2014)An online auction framework for dynamic resource provisioning in cloud computingThe 2014 ACM international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems10.1145/2591971.2591980(71-83)Online publication date: 16-Jun-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2591971.2591980
Manshaei MZhu QAlpcan TBacşar THubaux J(2013)Game theory meets network security and privacyACM Computing Surveys10.1145/2480741.248074245:3(1-39)Online publication date: 3-Jul-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2480741.2480742
Zhao BLui JChiu D(2012)A mathematical framework for analyzing adaptive incentive protocols in P2P networksIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking10.1109/TNET.2011.216177020:2(367-380)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2012
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TNET.2011.2161770
Yang MSassone V(2012)A game-theoretic analysis of cooperation in anonymity networksProceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_15(269-289)Online publication date: 24-Mar-2012
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_15
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