Abstract
Games associated with congestion situations à la Rosenthal (1973) have pure Nash equilibria. This result implicitly relies on the existence of a potential function. In this paper we provide a characterization of potential games in terms of coordination games and dummy games. Second, we extend Rosenthal's congestion model to an incomplete information setting, and show that the related Bayesian games are potential games and therefore have pure Bayesian equilibria.
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Facchini, G., van Megen, F., Borm, P. et al. CONGESTION MODELS AND WEIGHTED BAYESIAN POTENTIAL GAMES. Theory and Decision 42, 193–206 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004991825894
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004991825894