[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ Skip to main content
Log in

Self-questioning dynamical evolutionary game with altruistic behavior and sharing mechanism in scale-free network

  • Original Article
  • Published:
International Journal of Machine Learning and Cybernetics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The spatial evolutionary game is one of the efficient models to explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals. In the existing work, the relationship between self-questioning dynamical evolutionary game model and Ising model has been discussed. However, the study on the dividing lines which were used to distinguish entirely cooperative phase, entirely defective phase and cooperative and defective coexistence in the ground state is not enough. That is, the dividing lines were only considered to be suitable for regular networks before. To address this issue, a self-questioning evolutionary game model with altruistic or sharing preference is studied in scale-free Barabási–Albert networks. Using the Ising model theory and Monte Carlo simulation, it is found that the players considering their opponents’ payoffs with probability p are equivalent to the players sharing their payoffs with probability \(p/(1+p)\). A further research on the relationship between the self-questioning dynamical evolutionary game model and Ising model shows that the dividing lines are in fact unrelated to network structure, which means that the dividing lines are suitable for arbitrary networks. In addition, the nodes with large degree have higher stability and robustness than those with small degree.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
£29.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9

Similar content being viewed by others

Explore related subjects

Discover the latest articles, news and stories from top researchers in related subjects.

References

  1. Nowak MA, May RM (1992) Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359(6398):826–829

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Nowak MA (2006) Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life. Harvard University Press, Harvard, pp 145–166

    Book  Google Scholar 

  3. Nowak MA (2006) Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314(5805):1560–1563

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Perc M, Jordan JJ, Rand DG, Wang Z, Boccaletti S, Szolnoki A (2017) Statistical physics of human cooperation. Phys Rep 687:1–51

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Szabó G, Borsos I (2016) Evolutionary potential games on lattices. Phys Rep 624:1–60

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Szabó G, Fath G (2007) Evolutionary games on graphs. Phys Rep 446(4–6):97–216

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  7. Szabó G, Tőke C (1998) Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on a square lattice. Phys Rev E 58(1):69–73

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Szabó G, Vukov J, Szolnoki A (2005) Phase diagrams for an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on two-dimensional lattices. Phys Rev E 72(4):047107

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Zhang XL, Li DD (2020) How the individuals’ memory affects the evolution of prisoners’ dilemma game in the two-layer network. EPL 129(1):10002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  10. Wang B, Kang WJ, Sheng JF, Liu C, Dong QQ, Hu Y, Kabila MM (2020) Preferential selection based on payoff satisfaction and memory promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma games. EPL 129(3):38002

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Vukov J, Szabó G, Szolnoki A (2008) Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on Newman-Watts networks. Phys Rev E 77:026109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  12. Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2005) Scale-free networks provide a unifying framework for the emergence of cooperation. Phys Rev Lett 95:098104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Santos FC, Pacheco JM (2006) A new route to the evolution of cooperation. J Evol Biol 19(3):726–733

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Ye WX, Fan SH (2020) Evolutionary traveler’s dilemma game based on particle swarm optimization. Phys A Stat Mech Appl 544:123410

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Wang JW, Wang R, Yu FY, Wang ZW, Li QC (2020) Learning continuous and consistent strategy promotes cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma game with mixed strategy. Appl Math Comput 370:124887

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Wang WX, Ren J, Chen GR, Wang BH (2006) Memory-based snowdrift game on networks. Phys Rev E 74(5):056113

    Article  Google Scholar 

  17. Gao K, Wang WX, Wang BH (2007) Self-questioning games and ping-pong effect in the BA network. Phys A 380:528–538

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Liu YK, Li Z, Chen XJ, Wang L (2009) Evolutionary self-questioning games with local contribution. Chin Phys Lett 26(8):088902

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Yang B, Li XT, Chen W, Liu J, Chen XS (2016) Critical behavior of spatial evolutionary game with altruistic to spiteful preferences on two-dimensional lattices. Commun Theor Phys 66(4):439–446

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  20. Yang B, Fan M, Liu WQ, Chen XS (2017) Phase transition properties for the spatial public goods game with self-questioning mechanism. Acta Phys Sin 66(19):196401

    Google Scholar 

  21. Yang B, Zhang YW, Liu WQ, Chen XS (2018) Self-questioning dynamical evolutionary game in small-world networks. Sci Sin Phys Mech Astron 48(5):050501

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Liu J, Xu C, Hui PM (2017) Evolutionary games with self-questioning adaptive mechanism and the Ising model. EPL 119(6):68001

    Article  Google Scholar 

  23. Bester H, Güth W (1998) Is altruism evolutionarily stable? J Econ Behav Org 34(2):193–209

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Possajennikov A (2000) On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences. J Econ Behav Org 42(1):125–129

    Article  Google Scholar 

  25. Levine DK (1998) Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Rev Econ Dyn 1(3):593–622

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Klemm K, Khalil N (2020) Altruism in populations at the extinction transition. Phys Rev Res 2:013374

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Lu K, Wang SY, Xie L, Wang Z, Li MC (2017) Modeling altruism agents: Incentive mechanism in autonomous networks with other-regarding preference. Peer-to-Peer Netw Appl 10(5):1169–1181

    Article  Google Scholar 

  28. Wu ZX, Yang HX (2014) Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors. Phys Rev E 89(1):012109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  29. Xu HD, Fan SH, Tian CZ, Xiao XR (2019) Evolutionary investor sharing game on networks. Appl Math Comput 340:138–145

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  30. Li C, Xu HD, Fan SH (2020) Synergistic effects of self-optimization and imitation rules on the evolution of cooperation in the investor sharing game. Appl Math Comput 370:124922

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  31. Barabási AL, Albert R (1999) Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286:509–512

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  32. Albert R, Barabási AL (2002) Statistical mechanics of complex networks. Rev Mod Phys 74(1):47–97

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  33. Newman MEJ, Barkema GT (1999) Monte Carlo methods in statistical physics. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 84–91

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  34. Nishimori H, Ortiz G (2011) Elements of phase transitions and critical phenomena. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 16–51

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  35. Wang ZC (2000) Thermodynamics \(\cdot\) statistical physics. Higher Education Press, Beijing, pp 380–384

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Editors and reviewers as well as Dr. Yan Xu for their valuable comments and suggestions on the manuscript. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 11947041 and 11971211).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jinhai Li.

Ethics declarations

Conflicts of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Yang, B., Li, J. Self-questioning dynamical evolutionary game with altruistic behavior and sharing mechanism in scale-free network. Int. J. Mach. Learn. & Cyber. 12, 2317–2325 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13042-021-01311-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13042-021-01311-x

Keywords

Navigation