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Formal verification process of the compliance of a multicore AUTOSAR OS

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Abstract

\(\mathrm{A}\small{\mathrm{UTOSAR}}\) conformance testing is based on requirements verification. This work focuses on multicore operating system (OS) requirements, of which there are eighty. We present a semi-automated formal process to check multicore OS compliance using High-Level Colored Time Petri Net and model-checking methods. To apply our approach, we use the Roméo tool to build an operating system model called Trampoline that conforms to the AUTOSAR OS specification. Each requirement of the multicore OS is formalized by an observer modeled by a Petri net to evaluate compliance. The observers evolve according to the operating system evolution without altering its behavior to check whether the specification is true or false. The approach ensures that the operating system model respects the multicore specification of \(\mathrm{A}\small{\mathrm{UTOSAR}}\) OS.

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Data availability

The authors declare that the data used in this work is available on the Trampoline repository under a free license: https://github.com/TrampolineRTOS/trampoline/tree/master/tests/functional.

Notes

  1. https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/user_upload/standards/classic/4-2/AUTOSAR_SWS_OS.pdf

  2. https://github.com/TrampolineRTOS/trampoline

  3. OSEK Implementation Language.

  4. In the example in this section and in the examples that follow we present models designed with the tool Roméo. In this tool, \(\$any\) is used instead of any in guards and updates for syntactic reasons but both have the same meaning.

  5. The two double dots (::) are equivalent to an arc in the model. This syntax proposed by Roméo allows a clear and better organization of the Petri subnet in different XML files, which form only one Petri net. Thus a function call is ensured by the following syntax: the XML file name of the Petri subnet:: the place name to which we want to send a token.

  6. WCET corresponds to the worst execution time of the code between two service calls, and BCET to the best case execution time of the code between two service calls.

  7. https://github.com/TrampolineRTOS/GTL/blob/master/documentation/GTL.pdf

  8. They are available in the Trampoline repository: https://github.com/TrampolineRTOS/trampoline/tree/master/tests/functional

  9. \(mc\_alarms\_s1\) to \(mc\_taskTermination\_s2\) are modeled and verified except for \(mc\_taskTermination\_s1\), \(mc\_schedtables\_s1\), and \(mc\_autostart\_s3\) that are in progress: https://github.com/TrampolineRTOS/trampoline/tree/master/tests/functional

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Funding

This research work has been partly funded by ANRT and Huawei Technologies France under doctoral contract CIFRE2019-0798.

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Author notes

  1. Imane Haur, Jean-Luc Béchennec, and Olivier H. Roux contribute equally to this work.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Laboratoire des sciences du numérique de Nantes (LS2N), 1 Rue de la Noë, Nantes, 44300, France

    Imane Haur

  2. Huawei Paris Research center, 20 Quai du Point du Jour, Boulogne-Billancourt, 92100, France

    Imane Haur, Jean-Luc Béchennec & Olivier H. Roux

Authors
  1. Imane Haur
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  2. Jean-Luc Béchennec
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  3. Olivier H. Roux
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Correspondence to Imane Haur.

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Appendix. Requirements corresponding to multicore OS

Appendix. Requirements corresponding to multicore OS

See Table 3

Table 3 Subset of \(\mathrm{A}\small{\mathrm{UTOSAR}}\) OS requirements related to multicore
Full size table

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Haur, I., Béchennec, JL. & H. Roux, O. Formal verification process of the compliance of a multicore AUTOSAR OS. Software Qual J 31, 497–531 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11219-023-09626-4

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