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The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness

  • Special Section Article: Theory-Ladenness
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Abstract

In this paper, I claim that since (a) there is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and (b) cognitive penetrability (CP) and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision entails that early vision content is theory neutral. This theory-neutral part undermines relativism. In this paper, I consider two objections against the thesis. The one adduces evidence from cases of rapid perceptual learning to undermine my thesis that early vision is CI. The other emphasizes that the early perceptual system, in order to solve various underdetermination problems, relies on certain principles, which may be taken to constitute a sort of a theory about the world that affect early vision, rendering it theory-laden. Both objections purport to show that early vision is CP and theory-laden. Against this thesis, I argue that the evidence on which the two objections are based does not show that early vision is CP and is fully compatible with the view that early vision is CI.

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Notes

  1. Early vision includes a feed forward sweep (FFS) in which signals are transmitted bottom-up and which lasts, in visual areas, for about 100 ms, and a stage at which lateral and recurrent connections between neurons allow recurrent processing. This sort of recurrent processing, which starts at about 80 ms, is restricted within visual areas and does not involve signals from higher cognitive centers. Lamme (2003) calls it local recurrent processing (LRP). LRP culminates at about 120–130 ms. After that, signals from higher executive centers including mnemonic circuits intervene and modulate perceptual processing and this signals the onset of global recurrent processing (GRP). In what follows I refer to “early vision” and “perception” interchangeably unless I state otherwise.

  2. At a first glance the parallelism between epistemic and causal relations seems counterintuitive. After all, two contents can stand in an epistemic relation in the absence of any causal relationship between their respective contents. For example, A believes that p and B believes that p without A having ever met or spoken to B or without A coming to believe p from the same source as B. In this case, there is no causal relation between the two belief states of A and B and, yet, the contents of the two states are identical, and, thus, are epistemically related. Examples like these suggest that causal relations between states are orthogonal to the epistemic relations between their contents. However, I am not talking about the epistemic relations between contents in general but about the epistemic relations between the cognitive and perceptual contents of the same individual when she is viewing a visual scene. With this restriction, the parallelism between causal relations among states and epistemic relations among contents of the individual makes perfect sense.

  3. In this paper, I discuss the effects of visual memory and familiarity that affect the visual circuits in the sort-term, affecting the micro-circuitry of the visual areas. I have argued elsewhere (Raftopoulos 2009) that the perceptual learning that affects in the long-term the visual system and can (re)structure the macro-circuitry of the visual areas does not entail that perception is theory-laden.

  4. The P3 waveform of ERPs is elicited about 250–600 ms and is generated in many areas in the brain, including higher visual areas, and is associated with cognitive processing and the subjects’ reports. P3 may signify the consolidation of the representation of the object(s) in working memory.

  5. The terms “phenomenal seeing” and “doxastic seeing” are construed as in Dretske (1995).

  6. Even if one focuses on points that do not bias one or the other interpretation, the percept flips over between the two interpretations. (Long and Toppino 2004) That is, there is no neutral personal level representation of the whole figure.

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  1. Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Athanassios Raftopoulos

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Raftopoulos, A. The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness. J Gen Philos Sci 46, 87–103 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-015-9288-6

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