Abstract
We extend the reduced games introduced by Moulin (J Econ Theory 36:120–148, 1985) to multi-choice games, and define related properties of consistency and its converse. Since the unit-level-core proposed by Hwang and Liao (J Glob Optim 2009) violates (weak) converse consistency, we propose to minimally enlarge the unit-level-core so as to recover (weak) converse consistency.
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Liao, YH. Converse consistent enlargements of the unit-level-core of the multi-choice games. Cent Eur J Oper Res 20, 743–753 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-011-0201-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-011-0201-z