Agenda control in coalition formation

Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players. Keywords: Government Formation, Agenda Control, Coalitional Bargaining, Finite Bargaining Rules.

Authors and Affiliations

1.  GREQAM, and Ecole Supérieure de Mécanique de Marseille, 2 rue de la Charité, 13002 Marseille, France (e-mail: bloch@ehess.cnrs-mrs.fr), , , , , , FR

   Francis Bloch

2.  IRES and Banque Nationale de Belgique, Boulevard du Berlaimont 14, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium (e-mail: stephane.rottier@nbb.be), , , , , , BE

   Stéphane Rottier

Received: 26 January 2001/Accepted: 31 July 2001

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