[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ Skip to main content
Log in

Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper we study the problem of the determination of a fair allocation in a co-insurance problem, i.e., how some insurance companies have to share the risk and the premium. We develop two procedures that produce a proportional and an equitable allocation, respectively. The procedures are applied to a real situation arising from environmental risk and the resulting allocations are compared with the classical quota share allocation and with an envy-free allocation resulting from a procedure presented in Fragnelli and Marina (Insur. Math Econ 33:75–85, 2003).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
£29.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Borch K (1974) The mathematical theory of insurance. Lexington Books, Lexington

    Google Scholar 

  • Brams SJ, Taylor AD (1996) Fair-division. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Brams SJ, Taylor AD (1999) The win-win solution. W.W.Norton & Company, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Buhlmann H (1984) The general economic premium principle. Astin Bull 14:13–21

    Google Scholar 

  • Deprez O, Gerber HU (1985) On convex principles of premium calculation. Insur. Math Econ 4:179–189

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fragnelli V, Marina ME (2003) A fair procedure in insurance. Insur. Math Econ 33:75–85

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fragnelli V, Marina ME (2004) Co-insurance games and environmental pollution risk. In: Carraro C, Fragnelli V (eds) Game practice and the environment. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp 145–163

    Google Scholar 

  • Goovaerts MJ, De Vylder F, Haezendonck J (1984) Insurance premiums. North-Holland, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Haake CJ, Raith MG, Su FE (2002) Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. Soc Choice Welfare 19:723–749

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knaster B (1946) Sur le Problème du Partage Pragmatique de H Steinhaus. Ann Soc Pol Mathematique 19:228–230

    Google Scholar 

  • Myerson RB (1991) Game theory: analysis of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Nash JF (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 21:155–162

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raith MG (2000) Fair negotiation procedures. Math Soc Sci 39:303–322

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinhaus H (1948) The problem of fair division. Econometrica 16:101–104

    Google Scholar 

  • Suijs J, Borm P (1999) Stochastic cooperative games: superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents. Games Econ Behav 27:331–345

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomson W (1994) Cooperative models of bargaining. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (eds) Handbook of game theory, vol 2. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 1237–1284

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vito Fragnelli.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ambrosino, D., Fragnelli, V. & Marina, M.E. Resolving an Insurance Allocation Problem: A Procedural Approach. Soc Choice Welfare 26, 625–643 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0108-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0108-0

Keywords

Navigation