Dictatorial domains

In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.

Authors and Affiliations

1. PROS Revenue Management, Houston, USA , , , , , , US

   Navin Aswal

2. Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM, Mexico D.F. 10700, MEXICO , , , , , , MX

   Shurojit Chatterji

3. Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi 110016, INDIA (e-mail: asen@isid.ac.in) , , , , , , IN

   Arunava Sen

Received: July 12, 2000; revised version: March 21, 2002

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ID="*" The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their detailed comments.

Correspondence to: A. Sen

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