Abstract.
Two concepts of replication (conflictual and non-conflictual) are extended from the class of pure bargaining games to the class of NTU games. The behavior of the Harsanyi, Shapley NTU, Egalitarian and Maschler-Owen solutions of the replica games is compared with that of the Nash and Egalitarian solutions in pure bargaining games.
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Received June 1995/Final version February 2000
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Calvo, E., Garcı´a, I. & Zarzuelo, J. Replication invariance on NTU games. Game Theory 29, 473–486 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000050
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000050