Abstract
Mas-Colell (J Math Econ 18:129–139, 1989) proved that the bargaining set and the set of competitive allocations coincide in an exchange economy with a continuum of traders under some standard assumptions. We extend this result to continuum coalition production economies and prove that the bargaining set and the set of competitive allocations coincide in a coalition production economy with a continuum of traders under some standard assumptions. As a consequence, we obtain a coincidence theorem for the core and the set of competitive allocations in a coalition production economy which extends the well-known coincidence theorem by Aumann (Econometrica 32:39–50, 1964).
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the referees for their many helpful and inspiring suggestions and comments which resulted significant improvements to the paper. We also would like to thank the associate editor for useful comments.
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Appendix
Appendix
We first state the well-known Lyapunov Theorem which is needed for the next lemma.
Lyapunov Theorem
Let \((T, {\mathcal {F}}, \mu )\) be an atomless finite measure space and \(\mathbf{f}\) is an integrable function from T into \({\mathbb {R}}^{l}\). Then the set \(\{\int _{S}\mathbf{f}\,d\mu : S \in {\mathcal {F}}\}\) is a convex set in \({\mathbb {R}}^{l}\).
Lemma 4.1
The correspondence \(\psi (p)\) is convex for each \(p \in P\).
Proof
Fix \(p \in P\). To show \(\psi (p)\) is convex, we need to show that
Let \(v_{1}\), \(v_{2}\) be any two members in \(\psi (p)\) and \(\alpha \) be any constant satisfying \(0 \le \alpha \le 1\). By the definition of \(\psi (p)\), there exist \(f_{1}(p, t), f_{2}(p, t) \in \varphi (p, t)\) such that \(v_{1} = \int _{T}f_{1}(p, t)\,dt - \int _{T}\mathbf{w}(t)\,dt\) and \(v_{2} = \int _{T}f_{2}(p, t)\,dt - \int _{T}\mathbf{w}(t)\,dt\). Let \(g : {\mathcal {F}} \mapsto {\mathbb {R}}^{2l}\) be the atomless measure given by
for each \(S \in {\mathcal {F}}\). By Lyapunov Theorem, the set \(W = \{\int _{S}(f_{1}(p, t), f_{2}(p, t))\,dt : S \in {\mathcal {F}}\}\) is convex. Since 0 and \(\int _{T}(f_{1}(p, t), f_{2}(p, t))\,dt\) are in W, there exists \(S \in {\mathcal {F}}\) such that
which implies \(\int _{S}f_{1}(p, t)\,dt = \alpha \int _{T}f_{1}(p, t)\,dt\) and \(\int _{T {\setminus } S}f_{2}(p, t)\,dt = (1 - \alpha ) \int _{T}f_{2}(p, t)\,dt\). Define
Then \(f''(p, t) \in \varphi (p, t)\) as \(f_{1}(p, t), f_{2}(p, t) \in \varphi (p, t)\) and so \(\int _{T}f''(p, t)\,dt - \int _{T}\mathbf{w}(t)\,dt \in \psi (p)\). Moreover,
It follows that
Thus, (4.1) holds and \(\psi (p)\) is convex for each \(p \in P\). \(\square \)
Let F be a set-valued function from T to \({\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{l}\). F is called Borel measurable if its graph, \(\{(x, t) | x \in F(t)\}\), is a Borel subset of \({\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{l} \times T\).
Lemma 4.2
For fixed \(p \in P,\) the correspondence \(\varphi (p, t)\) is Borel measurable.
Proof
Fix \(p \in P\). We need to prove that \(\{(x, t)|x \in \varphi (p, t)\}\) is a Borel subset of \({\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{l} \times T\). Note from the definitions that if \(F(p, t)) \cap K = \emptyset \), then \(\sum _{i = 1}^{l}d^{j} > \alpha \) for any \(d \in F(p, t)\) which implies that \(\hat{K} \cap \{\lambda d : d \in F(p, t), \lambda \ge 1\} = \emptyset \). It follows from the definition of \(\varphi (p, t)\) that
Recall that K and \(\hat{K}\) are closed and F(p, t) is closed for each \(p \in P\) and each \(t \in T\), the set \((F(p, t) \cap K)\cup (\hat{K} \cap \{\lambda d : d \in F(p, t), \lambda \ge 0\})\) is closed and thus Borel. By the measurability assumption (A.4), the sets \(\{t : u_{t}(D(p, t)) > u_{t}(\mathbf{x}(t))\}\), \(\{t : u_{t}(D(p, t)) = u_{t}(\mathbf{x}(t))\}\), and \(\{t : u_{t}(D(p, t)) < u_{t}(\mathbf{x}(t))\}\) are Borel subsets. Thus, \(\{(x, t)|x \in \varphi (p, t)\}\) is a Borel subset of \({\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{l} \times T\). \(\square \)
We need the following result from Aumann (1965) for the proof of the next lemma.
Proposition 4.3
(Aumann 1965) Let \(F_{x}(t)\) be a set-valued function defined for \(t \in T\) and \(x \in A,\) all of whose values are bounded by the same integrable point-valued function, and such that \(F_{x}\) is Borel measurable for each fixed \(x \in A\). If \(F_{x}(t)\) is upper semicontinuous in x for each fixed t, then \(\int _{T}F_{x}(t)\,dt\) is upper semicontinuous.
Lemma 4.4
The correspondence \(\psi (p)\) is upper semicontinuous for each \(p \in P\).
Proof
By Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.3, we only need to prove that the correspondence \(\varphi (p, t)\) is upper semicontinuous for each fixed \(t \in T\). Fix \(t \in T\). Let \(p_{n} \rightarrow p\) with all \(p_{n}, p \in P\), \(z_{n}(t) \rightarrow z(t)\) with \(z_{n}(t) \in \varphi (p_{n}, t)\) for all \(n \ge 1\). We need to prove that \(z(t) \in \varphi (p, t)\). For each \(n \ge 1\), since \(z_{n}(t) \in \varphi (p_{n}, t)\), there exists \(a_{n}(t) \in F(p_{n}, t)\) and \(0 \le \lambda _{n}(t) \le 1\) such that
By the definition of \(F(p_{n}, t)\), we have either \(a_{n}(t) = \mathbf{w}(t)\) or \(a_{n}(t) \in D(p_{n}, t)\) for each \(n \ge 1\). Since \(0 \le \lambda _{n}(t) \le 1\) for all \(n \ge 1\), \(\{\lambda _{n}(t)\}_{n \ge 1}\) has a convergent subsequence, say, \(\lambda _{n}(t) \rightarrow \lambda (t)\). Clearly, \(0 \le \lambda (t) \le 1\). It follows from (4.2) that \(a_{n}(t) \rightarrow a(t) \in {\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{l}\) and
If \(a_{n}(t) = \mathbf{w}(t)\) for infinitely many n, then \(a(t) = \mathbf{w}(t)\) and we have \(z(t) \in \varphi (p, t)\). For otherwise, we may assume that \(a_{n}(t) \in D(p_{n}, t)\) for all \(n \ge 1\). By (3.4), we have \( p_{n} \cdot a_{n}(t) = p_{n} \cdot \mathbf{w}(t)\) for all \(n \ge 1\) which implies
Since each \(a_{n}(t)\) maximizes \(u_t\) on the budget set \(B_{p_{n}}(t)\), it follows that a(t) maximizes \(u_t\) on the budget set \(B_{p_{n}}(t)\) and so \(a(t) \in D(p, t)\). It follows that \(z(t) \in \varphi (p, t)\). Thus, \(\varphi (p, t)\) is upper semicontinuous. \(\square \)
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Liu, J., Zhang, H. Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy. Int J Game Theory 45, 1095–1109 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0511-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0511-9