Abstract
Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in non-zero-sum strategic games that possess (completely) mixed Nash equilibria. We find that under certain conditions maximin strategies have several interesting properties, some of which extend beyond 2-person strategic games. In particular, for n-person games we specify necessary and sufficient conditions for maximin strategies to yield the same expected payoffs as Nash equilibrium strategies. We also show how maximin strategies may facilitate payoff comparison across Nash equilibria as well as refine some Nash equilibrium strategies.
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Pruzhansky, V. Some interesting properties of maximin strategies. Int J Game Theory 40, 351–365 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0249-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0249-3