Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games

• Alcalde J (1996) Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems. J Econ Theory 69: 240–254

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Alcalde J, Perez-Castrillo D, Romero Medina A (1998) Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations. J Econ Theory 82: 469–480

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Alcalde , Romero Medina A (2000) Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems. Games Econ Behav 31: 294–302

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Alcalde , Romero Medina A (2005) Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem. Econ Lett 86: 153–158

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Banerjee S, Konishi H, Sonmez T (2001) Core in a simple coalition formation game. Soc Choice Welfare 18: 135–153

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Binmore K, Rubinstein A, Wolinsky A (1986) The Nash bargaining solution in economic modeling. RAND J Econ 17: 176–188

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Bloch F (1996) Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games Econ Behav 14: 90–123

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Bogomolnaia A, Jackson MO (2002) The stability of hedonic coalition structures. Games Econ Behav 38: 201–230

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Chaterjee K, Dutta B, Ray D, Sengupta K (1993) A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining. Rev Econ Stud 60: 463–477

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Chung K-S (2000) On the existence of stable roommate matchings. Games Econ Behav 33: 206–230

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Diamantoudi E, Xue L (2003) Farsighted stability in hedonic games. Soc Choice Welfare 21: 39–61

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Drèze JH, Greenberg J (1980) Hedonic coalitions: optimality and stability. Econometrica 48(4): 987–1003

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Farrell J, Scotchmer S (1988) Partnerships. Q J Econ 103: 279–297

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Gale D, Shapley L (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon 6(9): 9–15

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Hart S, Mas Colell A (1996) Bargaining and value. Econometrica 64: 357–380

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Kamecke U (1989) Non-cooperative matching games. Int J Game Theory 18: 423–431

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Krishna V, Serrano R (1996) Multilateral bargaining. Rev Econ Stud 63: 61–80

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Kultti K, Vartiainen H (2009) Multilateral cooperative bargaining in a general utility space. Int J Game Theory, forthcoming

• Livshits I (2002) On non-existence of pure strategy markov perfect equilibrium. Econ Lett 76: 393–396

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Maskin E (2003) Bargaining, coalitions and externalities. presidential address to the Econometric Society

• Moldovanu B, Winter E (1995) Order independent equilibria. Games Econ Behav 9: 21–34

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Moulin H, Shenker S (1994) Average cost pricing versus serial cost sharing: an axiomatic comparison. J Econ Theory 64: 178–201

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Okada A (1996) A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers. Games Econ Behav 16: 97–108

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Papai S (2004) Unique stability in simple coalition formation games. Games Econ Behav 48: 337–354

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Perez-Castrillo D, Sotomayor M (2002) Simple selling and buying procedure. J Econ Theory 103: 461–474

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Ray D (2007) A game theoretic perspective on coalition formation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK

  Book  Google Scholar 

• Ray D, Vohra R (1999) A theory of endogenous coalition structures. Games Econ Behav 26: 286–336

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Roth A, Sotomayor M (1990) Two-sided matching: a study in game theoretic modelling and analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  Google Scholar 

• Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50: 97–109

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Seidmann D, Winter E (1998) A theory of gradual coalition formation. Rev Econ Stud 65: 793–815

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Selten R (1981) A noncooperative model of characteristic function bargaining. In: Bohm V, Nachtkamp H (eds) Essays in game theory and mathematical economics. Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim, Mannheim

  Google Scholar 

• Shapley L, Scarf H (1974) On cores and indivisibilities. J Math Econ 1: 23–37

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Suh SC, Wen Q (2008) Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriages. Soc Choice Welfare 31: 163–174

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Sutton J (1986) Noncooperative bargaining theory: an introduction. Rev Econ Stud 53: 709–724

  Article  Google Scholar 

• Vidal-Puga J (2008) Forming coalitions and the shapley NTU value. Eur J Oper Res 190: 659–671

  Article  Google Scholar 

Download references