Abstract
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.
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Kultti, K., Vartiainen, H. Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space. Int J Game Theory 39, 677–689 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0212-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0212-3