[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/ Skip to main content
Log in

Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assumption, convergence need not hold.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
£29.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price includes VAT (United Kingdom)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Binmore K (1985) Bargaining and coalitions. In: Roth A (eds) Game theoretic models of bargaining. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Binmore K, Rubinstein A, Wolinsky A (1986) The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. Rand J Econ 17: 176–188

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chae S, Yang J-A (1988) The unique perfect equilibrium of an N-person bargaining game. Econ Lett 28: 221–223

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chae S, Yang J-A (1994) An N-person pure bargaining game. J Econ Theory 62: 86–102

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chatterjee K, Sabourian H (2000) Multiperson bargaining and strategic complexity. Econometrica 68: 1491–1509

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Herings PJJ, Predtetchinski A (2007) One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities. METEOR Research Memorandum 07/044, University of Maastricht

  • Herrero M (1985) Strategic theory of market institutions, unpublished Ph.D dissertation, LSE

  • Huang C-Y (2002) Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers. Econ Theory 20: 401–412

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krishna V, Serrano R (1996) Multilateral bargaining. Rev Econ Stud 63: 61–80

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kultti K, Vartiainen H (2007) Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining. J Econ Theory 137(1): 721–728

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lensberg T, Thomson W (1988) Characterizing the Nash solution without Parato-opitmality. Soc Choice Welfare 5: 547–559

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nash J (1950) The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18: 155–162

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rubinstein A (1982) Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50: 97–109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suh S-C, Wen Q (2006) Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution. J Math Econ 42: 61–73

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sutton J (1986) Non-cooperative bargaining theory: an introduction. Rev Econ Stud 53: 709–724

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomson W, Lensberg T (1989) Axiomatic theory of bargaining with variable number of agents. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hannu Vartiainen.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Kultti, K., Vartiainen, H. Multilateral non-cooperative bargaining in a general utility space. Int J Game Theory 39, 677–689 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0212-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0212-3

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation