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Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity

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Abstract

This article examines individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze the relationship between efforts and centrality on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of ordinal centrality. We first show that in both dominant and dominated equilibria central agents exert more effort. Second, we explore the issue of social coordination induced by our game.

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Correspondence to Mohamed Belhaj.

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Belhaj, M., Deroian, F. Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity. Int J Game Theory 39, 391–408 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0195-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0195-0

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