Abstract
This article examines individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze the relationship between efforts and centrality on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of ordinal centrality. We first show that in both dominant and dominated equilibria central agents exert more effort. Second, we explore the issue of social coordination induced by our game.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bala V, Goyal S (2000) A noncooperative model of network formation. Econometrica 68: 1181–1229
Ballester C, Calvó-Armengol A, Zénou Y (2006) Who’s who in networks. Wanted: the key player. Econometrica 74: 1403–1417
Belhaj M, Deroian F (2009) Risk-taking under heterogenous risk-sharing. GREQAM Working Paper 2009-06
Bloch F, Dutta B (2007) Communication networks with endogenous link strength, mimeo GREQAM
Bloch F, Quérou B (2008) Pricing on networks, mimeo
Bramoullé Y, Kranton R (2007) Public goods in networks. J Econ Theory 135(1): 478–494
Bramoullé Y, Kranton R, D’Amours M (2008) Strategic substitutes and networks, mimeo
Breschi S, Lissoni F (2006) Mobility of inventors and the geography of knowledge spillovers. New evidence on US data. CESPRI Working Papers 184
Cabrales A, Calvo-Armengol A, Zenou Y (2009) Social interactions and spillovers: incentives, segregation, and topology, mimeo
Cooper R, John A (1988) Coordinating coordination failures in keynesian models. Q J Econ 103: 441–463
Corbo J, Calvo-Armengol A, Parkes D (2007) The importance of network topology in local contribution games. In: Deng X, Graham F (eds) Internet and network economics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4858. Springer, Berlin, pp 388–395
Deroian F (2009) Endogenous link strength in directed communication networks. Math Soc Sci 57: 110–116
Feri F (2007) Stochastic stability in networks with decay. J Econ Theory 135: 442–457
Galeotti A, Goyal S (2009) The law of the few. Am Econ Rev (forthcoming)
Ghiglino C, Goyal S (2009) Keeping up with the neighbours: social interaction in a market economy. J Eur Econ Assoc (forthcoming)
Goyal S, Moraga L (2001) R&D networks. RAND J Econ 32: 686–707
Goyal S, Vega-Redondo F (2005) Network formation and social coordination. Games Econ Behav 50: 178–207
Hanaki N, Nakajima R, Ogura Y (2007) Dynamics of R&D Collaborations in IT industry. SSRN electronic paper collection
Hojman D, Szeidl A (2006) Core and periphery in endogenous networks, SSRN Working paper
Jackson M, Wolinsky A (1996) A Strategic model of economic and social networks. J Econ Theory 71: 44–74
Matsubayashi N, Yamakawa S (2006) A note on network formation with decay. Econ Lett 93(3): 387–392
Rogers M (2005) A strategic theory of network status, mimeo, MEDS, Northwestern University
Singh J (2005) Collaborative networks as determinants of knowledge diffusion patterns. Manage Sci 51: 756–770
Topkis D (1979) Equilibrium points in nonzero-sum n-person submodular games. SIAM J Control Optim 17: 773–787
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Belhaj, M., Deroian, F. Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity. Int J Game Theory 39, 391–408 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0195-0
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0195-0