Abstract
The aim of the paper is to characterize the classical convexity notion for cooperative TU games by means of the Mas-Colell and the Davis–Maschler bargaining sets. A new set of payoff vectors is introduced and analyzed: the max-Weber set. This set is defined as the convex hull of the max-marginal worth vectors. The characterizations of convexity are reached by comparing the classical Weber set, the max-Weber set and a selected bargaining set.
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We thank M. Núñez and F.J. Martínez-de-Albéniz for their helpful comments and M. Maschler for valuable suggestions. We also thank the associate editor and the referees for their fitting remarks. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Government and FEDER under grant SEJ2005-02443/ECON, from Generalitat de Catalunya under grant 2005SGR00984 and from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA.
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Izquierdo, J.M., Rafels, C. A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets. Int J Game Theory 37, 321–332 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0120-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0120-y