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Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

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Abstract

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium definitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of definitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible.

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Correspondence to Francis Bloch.

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Bloch is also affiliated with the University of Warwick.

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Bloch, F., Jackson, M.O. Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games. Int J Game Theory 34, 305–318 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0022-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0022-9

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