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Robustness of optimal decision rules where one of the team members is exceptionally qualified

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Abstract

This work investigates the robustness of optimal decision rules under a changing size of a decision group where the competence of one member is outstanding while the others possess an identical competence. More specifically, we focus on the expert rule, the almost expert rule and the tie-breaking chairperson rule. We first establish criteria for the optimality of each of these rules and then use it to investigate their robustness. Robustness is an important property of decision rules, especially when cost of adjustment to a new rule is high. Our findings are that the expert rule and the chairperson rule are robust while the almost expert rule is not.

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Notes

  1. On the phenomenon of single pickedness in decision rules (essential order), see Karotkin et al. (1988), Paroush (1997) and Karotkin (1998).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 52900, Israel

    Drora Karotkin & Jacob Paroush

Authors
  1. Drora Karotkin
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  2. Jacob Paroush
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Correspondence to Drora Karotkin.

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Karotkin, D., Paroush, J. Robustness of optimal decision rules where one of the team members is exceptionally qualified. Soc Choice Welfare 26, 131–141 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0053-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0053-3

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