Information and preference aggregation

Abstract.

We investigate the implications of relaxing Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom while retaining transitivity and the Pareto condition. Even a small relaxation opens a floodgate of possibilities for nondictatorial and efficient social choice.

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Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA (e-mail: decamp@malthus.morton.wm.edu), , , , , , US

   Donald E. Campbell

2. Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA (e-mail: jskelly@maxwell.syr.edu), , , , , , US

   Jerry S. Kelly

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1. Donald E. Campbell
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2. Jerry S. Kelly
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Received: 20 August 1997/Accepted: 29 September 1998

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Campbell, D., Kelly, J. Information and preference aggregation. Soc Choice Welfare 17, 3–24 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007172

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• Issue Date: January 2000

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00007172

Keywords

• Social Choice
• Preference Aggregation
• Irrelevant Alternative
• Small Relaxation
• Pareto Condition