[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
Skip to main content

Agency and the logic of ability

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Formalisms, Methodologies, and Applications (DAI 1997)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 1441))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Theories of ability based on the dynamic logic of programs often presuppose that the agent has complete control over its actions to the extent that execution of the action never fails. Similarly, logical theories of ‘seeing to it that’, Belnap and Perloff (1988) and ‘bringing it about', Segerberg (1989), model the result of an action without regard to the original intention of the agent, so these logics are not of direct use to formalizing the reasoning of a planning agent which must make a judgement about the likelihood of its action succeeding. In this paper, we propose an analysis of simple ability, i.e. considering only atomic actions, which is compatible with both the present and future directed sense of intention, whilst admitting the possibility of action failure. The basic idea is that an agent has the ability to do an action A to achieve some goal G if it normally brings about G when attempting to do so by doing A. We shall assume a primitive notion of ‘attempting’ or, as Bratman (1987) calls it, endeavouring, to perform an action to achieve some goal. Thus goal-directed behaviour is central to defining ability. In the latter part of the paper, we argue that this concept is also central to defining agency. We propose that agency is best understood as self-controlled goal-directed activity, where the notion of an action being under the control of an agent is intimately tied to the agent's ability to perform that action successfully under normal conditions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Asher, N. & Morreau, M. (1991) ‘Commonsense Entailment: A Modal Theory of Nonmonotonic Reasoning.’ Proceedings of the Twelfth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 387–392.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austin, J.L. (1961) Philosophical Papers. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barwise, J. & Perry, J. (1983) Situations and Attitudes. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Belnap, N.D. & Perloff, M. (1988) ‘Seeing To It That: A Canonical Form for Agentives.’ Theoria, 54,175–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blamey, S. (1986) ‘Partial Logic’ in Gabbay, D.M. & Guenthner, F. (Eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Volume 3. Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boutilier, C. (1990) ‘Conditional Logics of Normality as Modal Systems.’ Proceedings of the Eighth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-90), 594–599.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradshaw, J.M. (1997) ‘An Introduction to Software Agents.’ in Bradshaw, J.M. (Ed.) Software Agents. AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bratman, M.E. (1987) Intention, Plans and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, M.A. (1988) ‘On the Logic of Ability.’ Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17, 1–26.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, P.R. & Levesque, H.J. (1990) ‘Rational Interaction as the Basis for Communication.’ in Cohen, P.J., Morgan, J.L. & Pollack, M.E. (Eds) Intentions in Communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Delgrande, J.P. (1987) ‘A First-Order Conditional Logic for Prototypical Properties.’ Artificial Intelligence, 33, 105–130.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D.C. (1984) Elbow Room. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D.C. (1987) The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Devlin, K. (1991) Logic and Information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F.I. (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F.I. (1988) Explaining Behavior. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elgesem, D. (1993) ‘Action Theory and Modal Logic’ Ph.D. Thesis, Institute for Philosophy, University of Oslo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franklin, S. & Graesser, A. (1997) ‘Is It an Agent, or Just a Program?: A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents.’ in Müller, J., Wooldridge, M. & Jennings N. (Eds) Intelligent Agents III. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kenny, A. (1975) Will, Freedom and Power. Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S.A. (1972) Naming and Necessity. Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Langholm, T. (1988) Partiality, Truth and Persistence. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford, CA.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Maes, P. (1994) ‘Modeling Adaptive Autonomous Agents.’ Artificial Life Journal, 1, 135–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R.G. (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, R.C. (1985) ‘A Formal Theory of Knowledge and Action.’ in Hobbs, J.R. & Moore, R.C. (Eds) Formal Theories of the Commonsense World. Ablex, Norwood, NJ.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgenstern, L. (1986) ‘A First Order Theory of Planning, Knowledge, and Action.’ in Halpern, J.Y. (Ed.) Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986 Conference. Morgan Kaufmann, Los Altos, CA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nwana, H.S. & Azarmi, N. (Eds) (1997) Software Agents and Soft Computing. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Rao, A.S. & Georgeff, M.P. (1991) ‘Modeling Rational Agents within a BDI-Architecture.’ Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 473–484.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J.R. (1969) Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Segerberg, K. (1989) ‘Bringing It About.’ Journal of Philosophical Logic, 18, 327–347.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Singh, M.P. (1994) Multiagent Systems. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • van der Hoek, W., van Linder, B. & Meyer, J.-J. Ch. (1994) ‘A Logic of Capabilities.’ Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on the Logical Foundations of Computer Science, 366–378.

    Google Scholar 

  • Veltman, F. (1981) ‘Data Semantics.’ in Groenendijk, J.A.G., Janssen, T.M.V. & Slokhof, M.B.J. (Eds) Formal Methods in the Study of Language. Part 2. Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Werner, E. (1991) ‘A Unified View of Information, Intention and Ability.’ in Demazeau, Y. & Müller, J.-P. (Eds) Decentralized Artificial Intelligence. Volume 2. Elsevier North-Holland, Amsterdam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wobcke, W.R. (1989) ‘A Schema-Based Approach to Understanding Subjunctive Conditionals.’ Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1461–1466.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Wayne Wobcke Maurice Pagnucco Chengqi Zhang

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Wobcke, W. (1998). Agency and the logic of ability. In: Wobcke, W., Pagnucco, M., Zhang, C. (eds) Agents and Multi-Agent Systems Formalisms, Methodologies, and Applications. DAI 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1441. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0055018

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0055018

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-64769-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68722-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics