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A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria

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International Journal of Game Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A class of noncooperative games (of interest in certain applications) is described. Each game in the class is shown to possess at least one Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.

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References

  • Charnes, A., andW. Cooper: Management Models and Industrial Applications of Linear Programming vol. II, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1961, pp. 785–797.

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  • Rosenthal, R.: “The Network Equilibrium Problem in Integers”, forthcoming in Networks.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Sciences, Northwestern University Evanston, 60201, Illinois

    Robert W. Rosenthal

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  1. Robert W. Rosenthal
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Rosenthal, R.W. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Int J Game Theory 2, 65–67 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559

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