Abstract
In spot markets for trading fishes, single-sided auctions are used for clearing the market by virtue of its promptness and simplicity, which are important in dealing with perishable goods. However, in those auctions, sellers cannot participate in price-making process. A standard double auction market collects bids from traders and matches buyers’ higher bids and sellers’ lower bids to find the most efficient allocation, assuming that values of unsold items remain unchanged. Nevertheless, in the spot fish market, sellers suffer loss when they fail to sell the fish, whose salvage value is lost due to perishability. To solve the problem, we investigate the suitable design of an online double auction for fishery markets, where bids arrive dynamically with their time limits. Our market mechanism aims at improving traders’ profitability by reducing trade failures in the face of uncertainty of incoming/leaving bids. We developed a heuristic matching rule for the market to prioritize traders’ bids based on their time-criticality and evaluated its performance empirically.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bastian, C., Menkhaus, D., O’Neill, P., Phillips, O.: Supply and Demand Risks in Laboratory Forward and Spot Markets: Implications for Agriculture. Jounal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 159–173 (April 2000)
Wang, C.X., Webster, S.: Markdown money contracts for perishable goods with clearance pricing. European Journal of Operational Research 196(3), 1113–1122 (2009)
Myerson, R.B.: Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58–73 (1981)
Krogmeier, J., Menkhaus, D., Phillips, O., Schmitz, J.: An experimental economics approach to analyzing price discovery in forward and spot markets. Jounal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 2, 327–336 (1997)
Mestelman, S.: The Performance of Double-Auction and Posted-Offer Markets with Advance Production. In: Plott, C.R., Smith, V.L. (eds.) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, vol. 1, pp. 77–82. Elsevier (2008)
Blum, A., Sandholm, T., Zinkevich, M.: Online algorithms for market clearing. Journal of the ACM 53(5), 845–879 (2006)
Bredin, J., Parkes, D.C., Duong, Q.: Chain: A dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 30(1), 133–179 (2007)
Zhao, D., Zhang, D., Perrussel, L.: Mechanism Design for Double Auctions with Temporal Constraints. In: Proceedings of IJCAI, pp. 1–6 (2011)
Talluri, K.T., van Ryzin, G.J.: The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell (2004)
Myerson, R., Satterthwaite, M.: Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. Journal of Economic Theory 29(2), 265–281 (1983)
Zhao, D., Zhang, D., Khan, M., Perrussel, L.: Maximal Matching for Double Auction. In: Li, J. (ed.) AI 2010. LNCS, vol. 6464, pp. 516–525. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Satterthwaite, M.A., Williams, S.R.: Bilateral Trade with the Sealed Bid k-Double Auction: Existence and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 48(1), 107–133 (1989)
Walsh, W., Das, R., Tesauro, G., Kephart, J.: Analyzing complex strategic interactions in multi-agent systems. In: AAAI 2002 Workshop on Game-Theoretic and Decision-Theoretic Agents, pp. 109–118 (2002)
Guillotreau, P., Jiménez-Toribio, R.: The price effect of expanding fish auction markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 79(3), 211–225 (2011)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Miyashita, K. (2013). Developing Online Double Auction Mechanism for Fishery Markets. In: Ali, M., Bosse, T., Hindriks, K.V., Hoogendoorn, M., Jonker, C.M., Treur, J. (eds) Recent Trends in Applied Artificial Intelligence. IEA/AIE 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7906. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38577-3_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38577-3_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38576-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38577-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)