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A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks

  • Conference paper
Game Theory for Networks (GameNets 2012)

Abstract

We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of N inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.

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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Borndörfer, R., Omont, B., Sagnol, G., Swarat, E. (2012). A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks. In: Krishnamurthy, V., Zhao, Q., Huang, M., Wen, Y. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2012. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 105. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35581-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35582-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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