Abstract
We propose a game theoretic model for the spatial distribution of inspectors on a transportation network. The problem is to spread out the controls so as to enforce the payment of a transit toll. We formulate a linear program to find the control distribution which maximizes the expected toll revenue, and a mixed integer program for the problem of minimizing the number of evaders. Furthermore, we show that the problem of finding an optimal mixed strategy for a coalition of N inspectors can be solved efficiently by a column generation procedure. Finally, we give experimental results from an application to the truck toll on German motorways.
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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Borndörfer, R., Omont, B., Sagnol, G., Swarat, E. (2012). A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks. In: Krishnamurthy, V., Zhao, Q., Huang, M., Wen, Y. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2012. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 105. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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