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Effective Electronic Advertisement Auction System

  • Conference paper
Communication and Networking (FGCN 2011)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 266))

  • 874 Accesses

Abstract

A structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. It is known that Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Some searching sites employ GSP mechanism basically. There are a lot of researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. That is means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, an effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the value of advertisement. We analyze the auctioneer’s profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and our proposed mechanism. The contribution of our research includes to clarify the features and advantages of advertisement auctions and effects to search service sites’ profit rate.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Yamagata University, 4-3-16, Jonan, Yonezawa, Yamagata, 992-8510, Japan

    Tokuro Matsuo

  2. Graduate School of System and Information Engineering, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennoudai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan

    Satoshi Takahashi

Authors
  1. Tokuro Matsuo
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  2. Satoshi Takahashi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Multimedia Engineering Department, Hannam University, 133 Ojeong-dong, Daeduk-gu, Daejeon, Korea

    Tai-hoon Kim

  2. The Ohio State University, 470 Hitchcock Hall, 2070 Neil Avenue, 43210-1275, Columbus, OH, USA

    Hojjat Adeli

  3. National Chiao Tung University, Hsinchu, Taiwan, R.O.C.

    Wai-chi Fang

  4. University of Western Macedonia, Kozani, Greece

    Thanos Vasilakos

  5. Jet Propulsion Laboratory/Caltech, NASA, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, 91109, Pasadena, CA, USA

    Adrian Stoica

  6. National Technical University of Athens, Heroon Politechniou 9, Zographou T.K., 157 73, Athens, Greece

    Charalampos Z. Patrikakis

  7. The Computing Laboratory, University of Kent, CT2 7NF, Canterbury, UK

    Gansen Zhao

  8. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 28040, Madrid, Spain

    Javier García Villalba

  9. The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA

    Yang Xiao

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Matsuo, T., Takahashi, S. (2011). Effective Electronic Advertisement Auction System. In: Kim, Th., et al. Communication and Networking. FGCN 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 266. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27201-1_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27201-1_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-27200-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-27201-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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