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The Snowball Effect of Uncertainty in Potential Games

  • Conference paper
Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 7090))

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Abstract

Uncertainty is present in different guises in many settings, in particular in environments with strategic interactions. However, most game-theoretic models assume that players can accurately observe interactions and their own costs. In this paper we quantify the effect on social costs of two different types of uncertainty: adversarial perturbations of small magnitude to costs (effect called the Price of Uncertainty (PoU) [3]) and the presence of several players with Byzantine, i.e. arbitrary, behavior (effect we call the Price of Byzantine behavior (PoB)). We provide lower and upper bounds on PoU and PoB in two well-studied classes of potential games: consensus games and set-covering games.

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Balcan, MF., Constantin, F., Ehrlich, S. (2011). The Snowball Effect of Uncertainty in Potential Games. In: Chen, N., Elkind, E., Koutsoupias, E. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7090. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25510-6_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25509-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-25510-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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