Abstract
Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts in understanding strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise. The idea is to view informational contexts as the fixed-points of iterated, “rational responses” to incoming information about the agents’ possible choices. We show general conditions for the stabilization of such sequences of rational responses, in terms of structural properties of both the decision rule and the information update policy.
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Pacuit, E., Roy, O. (2011). A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality. In: van Ditmarsch, H., Lang, J., Ju, S. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6953. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_18
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