Abstract
In this paper, an optimal auction model that maximizes the seller’s expected utility is proposed for a kind of indivisible goods. Firstly, the correlation of bidders’ valuations and the asymmetry of the private information are analyzed. Then, the properties of the optimal auction are given. Thirdly, the feasibility of optimal auction is discussed. Finally, an example of the optimal auction is given to show how to apply the discriminatory auction to realize the optimal auction mechanism. Therefore, this paper effectively generalizes the auction models with single-unit.
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Rao, C., Zhao, Y., Bao, H., Wang, Q. (2009). Optimal Auction Model Analysis and Mechanism Design of Indivisible Goods. In: Yu, W., He, H., Zhang, N. (eds) Advances in Neural Networks – ISNN 2009. ISNN 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5551. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01507-6_131
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01507-6_131
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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