Abstract
Agent technology is emerging as a new software paradigm in the areas of distributed computing. The use of multiple agents is a common technique in agent-based systems. In distributed agent systems, it is often required for two agents to communicate securely over a public network. Authentication and key exchange are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public insecure networks. Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange are designed to work even when user authentication is done via the use of passwords drawn from a small known set of values. There have been many protocols proposed over the years for password authenticated key exchange in the three-party scenario, in which two agents attempt to establish a secret key interacting with one same authentication server. However, little has been done for password authenticated key exchange in the more general and realistic four-party setting, where two clients (or, two agents) trying to establish a secret key are registered with different authentication servers. In this paper, we propose a new protocol designed carefully for four-party password authenticated key exchange that requires each agent only to remember a password shared with its authentication server.
This work was supported by the Korean Ministry of Information and Communication under the Information Technology Research Center (ITRC) support program supervised by the Institute of Information Technology Assessment (IITA).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Abdalla, M., Fouque, P.-A., Pointcheval, D.: Password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) PKC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3386, pp. 65–84. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., Pointcheval, D., Quisquater, J.-J.: Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In: Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2001), pp. 255–264 (2001)
Bellare, M., Namprempre, C.: Authenticated encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 531–545. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In: Proc. ACM CCS 1993, pp. 62–73 (1993)
Boyko, V., MacKenzie, P.D., Patel, S.: Provably Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Using Diffie-Hellman. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 156–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Diffie, W., Oorschot, P., Wiener, M.: Authentication and authenticated key exchanges. Designs, Codes, and Cryptography 2(2), 107–125 (1992)
Ding, Y., Horster, P.: Undectectable on-line password guessing attacks. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 29(4), 77–86 (1995)
Dolev, D., Dwork, C., Naor, M.: Nonmalleable cryptography. SIAM Journal on Computing 30(2), 391–437 (2000)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rivest, R.: A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks. SIAM Journal of Computing 17(2), 281–308 (1988)
Gong, L., Lomas, M.-L., Needham, R.-M., Saltzer, J.-H.: Protecting poorly chosen secrets from guessing attacks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 11(5), 648–656 (1993)
Jiang, S., Gong, G.: Password based key exchange with mutual authentication. In: Handschuh, H., Hasan, M.A. (eds.) SAC 2004. LNCS, vol. 3357, pp. 267–279. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: Efficient password-authenticated key exchange using human-memorable passwords. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 475–494. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Katz, J., Yung, M.: Unforgeable encryption and chosen ciphertext secure modes of operation. In: Schneier, B. (ed.) FSE 2000. LNCS, vol. 1978, pp. 284–299. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Kohl, J.-T., Neumanm, B.-C.: The Kerberos Network Authentication Service, Version 5 Revision 5. Project Athena, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1992)
Lin, C.-L., Sun, H.-M., Hwang, T.: Three-party encrypted key exchange: attacks and a solution. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 34(4), 12–20 (2000)
Rogaway, P., Bellare, M., Black, J., Krovetz, T.: OCB: A block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption. In: Proc. ACM CCS 2001, pp. 196–205 (2001)
Steiner, M., Tsudik, G., Waidner, M.: Refinement and extension of encrpyted key exchange. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 29(3), 22–30 (1995)
Zhang, M.: New approaches to password authenticated key exchange based on RSA. In: Lee, P.J. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3329, pp. 230–244. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Lee, Y., Nam, J., Kwak, J., Won, D. (2007). Password-Only Authenticated Key Exchange Between Two Agents in the Four-Party Setting. In: Nguyen, N.T., Grzech, A., Howlett, R.J., Jain, L.C. (eds) Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications. KES-AMSTA 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4496. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_64
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72830-6_64
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-72829-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-72830-6
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)