Abstract
In this paper, we propose two new generic conversion schemes which generate IND-CCA security from probabilistic public key encryption primitives, given that the underlying primitives are OW-PCA secure in the random oracle model.
Compared to the previous generic conversions (GEM, REACT, etc.), both of our proposals have the advantage of compactness (if the input size of the public key encryption primitive is large), which is especially meaningful in the bandwidth-saving channels. Note that the latter one of our proposals has not necessarily to carry out the re-encryption for validity check, which will accelerate the decryption greatly.
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Cui, Y., Kobara, K., Imai, H. (2003). Compact Conversion Schemes for the Probabilistic OW-PCA Primitives. In: Qing, S., Gollmann, D., Zhou, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2836. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39927-8_25
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39927-8_25
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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