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Security Risk: Detection of Compromising Emanations Radiated or Conducted by Display Units

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Future Access Enablers for Ubiquitous and Intelligent Infrastructures (FABULOUS 2017)

Abstract

In this paper we propose a method of detecting the propagation frequencies of compromising emanations in order to evaluate the risk of eavesdropping the display units. By modulating the video signal with an audio file, we have been able to detect the compromising emanations on the frequencies where the audition occurred. The level of those emanations is an important issue in the process of evaluating the security risk. The higher the level, the higher is the probability of detection and reconstruction of displayed information.

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the grant of the Ministry of Innovation and Research, UEFISCDI, project number 5 Sol/2017 ToR-SIM within PNCDI III.

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Correspondence to Răzvan Bărtușică .

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© 2018 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Bărtușică, R., Boitan, A., Halunga, S., Popescu, M., Bindar, V. (2018). Security Risk: Detection of Compromising Emanations Radiated or Conducted by Display Units. In: Fratu, O., Militaru, N., Halunga, S. (eds) Future Access Enablers for Ubiquitous and Intelligent Infrastructures. FABULOUS 2017. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 241. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92213-3_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92213-3_7

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-92212-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-92213-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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