Abstract
We present the view that the method of multi-level access control, often considered confined in the theory of mandatory access control, is in fact necessary for data secrecy (i.e. confidentiality) and privacy. This is consequence of a result in directed graph theory showing that there is a partial order of components in any data flow graph. Then, given the data flow graph of any access control system, it is in principle possible to determine which multi-level access control system it implements. On the other hand, given any desired data flow graph, it is possible to assign subjects and data objects to its different levels and thus implement a multi-level access control system for secrecy and privacy. As a consequence, we propose that the well-established lattice model of secure information flow be replaced by a model based on partial orders of components. Applications to Internet of Things and Cloud contexts are briefly mentioned.
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Acknowledgment
This work was partially supported by a grant of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. The author is indebted to Sofiene Boulares and Abdelouadoud Stambouli for many useful discussions, and to Guy-Vincent Jourdan for useful comments on the draft copy.
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Logrippo, L. (2018). Multi-level Access Control, Directed Graphs and Partial Orders in Flow Control for Data Secrecy and Privacy. In: Imine, A., Fernandez, J., Marion, JY., Logrippo, L., Garcia-Alfaro, J. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10723. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75650-9_8
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