Abstract
One-sided auctions are used in the spot markets for perishable goods because production cost is already “sunk.” Moreover, the promptness and simplicity of one-sided auctions are beneficial for trading in perishable goods. However, sellers cannot participate in the price-making process in these auctions. A standard double auction market collects bids from traders and matches them to find the most efficient allocation, assuming that the value of unsold items remains unchanged. Nevertheless, in the market for perishable goods, sellers suffer a loss when they fail to sell their goods, because their salvage values are lost when the goods perish. To solve this problem, we investigate the design of an online double auction for perishable goods, where bids arrive dynamically with their time limits. Our market mechanism aims at improving the profitability of traders by reducing trade failures in the face of uncertainty of incoming/departing bids. We develop a heuristic market mechanism with an allocation policy that prioritizes bids based on their time-criticality, and evaluate its performance empirically using multi-agent simulation. We find out that our market mechanism realizes efficient and fair allocations among traders with truthful behavior in different market situations.
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Notes
- 1.
In other words, their salvage value reduces to zero.
- 2.
When we must distinguish between claims made by buyers and claims made by sellers, we refer to the bid from a buyer and the ask from a seller.
- 3.
Successful trade in previous rounds of period \(p\) make the current quantity of goods reduce to \(q_i^t \le q_i^p\).
- 4.
It should be noted that even when sellers use the MOD strategy, they can make reasonable profits in the low-risk market.
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Acknowledgments
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 24300101.
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Miyashita, K. (2014). Online Double Auction for Perishable Goods. In: Ceppi, S., et al. Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets. AMEC AMEC TADA TADA 2014 2013 2014 2013. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 187. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13218-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13218-1_9
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