Abstract
Industrial control systems perform vital cyber-physical functions in critical infrastructure assets. Programmable logic controllers, which are prominently found in industrial control environments, execute the operational control logic of cyber-physical systems. Due to the continued escalation of cyber attacks targeting industrial control systems and programmable logic controllers, strengthening the trust and resilience of these systems is paramount.
This chapter proposes an approach that leverages virtualization, cryptographic attestation, software-defined networking, security orchestration and a proprietary programmable logic controller runtime application to advance programmable logic controller trust and resilience while facilitating integration in deployed systems. A proof-of-concept capability demonstrated on a physical industrial control system testbed validates the approach. The experimental results confirm that the approach is viable for industrial control applications.
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Cervini, J., Muller, D., Beall, A., Maurio, J., Rubin, A., Watkins, L. (2022). TRUSTED VIRTUALIZATION-BASED PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER RESILIENCE USING A BACKFIT APPROACH. In: Staggs, J., Shenoi, S. (eds) Critical Infrastructure Protection XVI. ICCIP 2022. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, vol 666. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20137-0_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20137-0_4
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