Abstract
We propose a two-party cryptographic protocol for detecting traffic hijacking over the Internet. Our proposal relies on a distance-bounding mechanism that measures the round-trip time of packets to decide whether an attack is ongoing. The protocol requires only two cryptographic operations per execution which leads to very few additional workload for the users. We demonstrate the efficiency of the protocol using large-scale experiments and we discuss the choice of the decision function w.r.t. the false positive and negative cases.
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Notes
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For the sake of clarity, we assume that the k packets are consecutive, but this assumption is actually not necessary.
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We elaborate on how a relay node was implemented on Sect. 4.
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Note that traceroute can only deliver a probable and punctual estimation of the route between two points, such a route can change over time.
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Appendices
A Description of Other Candidates for the Decision Function
We initially selected 4 other candidates for potential decision function. We did identical experiments to decide which one was the most efficient. Some test showed acceptable results but none was as precise as the one presented in Sect. 3.3. We present here the tests and their results.
1.1 A.1 Average Position
This test computes the mean of samp \(\mu _{samp}\) and computes the \(80\%\)-density interval \(I_80(ref)\) of ref. It returns 1 if \(\mu _{samp} \in I_{80}(ref)\), 0 otherwise.
1.2 A.2 \(10\%\)-Minimum Overlap
This test computes the first decile of the both samples \(q_{10}(samp)\), \(q_{10}(ref)\) and consider the intervals \(I=[min(samp),q_{10}(samp)]\) and \(I'=[min(ref),q_{10}(ref)]\). It returns 1 if at least \(50\%\) of I overlaps \(I'\), that is to say if: \(\frac{len(I\cap I')}{len(I)}>0.5\). It returns 0 otherwise.
1.3 A.3 \(50\%\)-Minimum Overlap
This test computes the median of the both samples \(q_{50}(samp)\), \(q_{50}(ref)\) and consider the intervals \(I=[min(samp),q_{50}(samp)]\) and \(I'=[min(ref),q_{50}(ref)]\). It returns 1 if at least \(50\%\) of I overlaps \(I'\), that is to say if: \(\frac{len(I\cap I')}{len(I)}>0.5\). It returns 0 otherwise.
1.4 A.4 Density Match
This test computes \(80\%\)-density interval \(I_{80}(ref)\) and checks the proportion p of elements of samp being in this interval. It returns 1 if \(p>0.5\) , 0 otherwise
B Experiments for all the Tests
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Arfaoui, G., Avoine, G., Gimenez, O., Traoré, J. (2021). How Distance-Bounding Can Detect Internet Traffic Hijacking. In: Conti, M., Stevens, M., Krenn, S. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 13099. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92548-2_19
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