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Fuzzy Shapley Value-Based Solution for Communication Network

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Computational Collective Intelligence (ICCCI 2019)

Abstract

The paper presents a solution to the problem of cost allocation for a communication network in which the connection values between two nodes are defined by a fuzzy utility function. The utility function can refer to both existing communication nodes and new node proposals. For the allocation mechanism, the authors used the fuzzy Shapley value built on a complete coalition of all paths connecting the root of the tree with all nodes of the given network.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A broader look at the value of Shapley in such situations can be found, for example, in the work of Gladysz and Mercik (2018).

  2. 2.

    It is worth noting that there are many possible solutions related to rejection of the same probability of coalition implementation and modification of Shapley value (e.g. Gambarelli and Owen (1994); Mercik (2015, 2016) or Forlicz et al. (2018).

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Acknowledgements

The research is partially supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education for Faculty of Computer Science and Management, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology (No 0401/0193/18), by AGH University of Science and Technology funds (No. 16.16.200.396) and by WSB University in Wroclaw.

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Correspondence to Jacek Mercik .

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Gładysz, B., Mercik, J., Stach, I. (2019). Fuzzy Shapley Value-Based Solution for Communication Network. In: Nguyen, N., Chbeir, R., Exposito, E., Aniorté, P., Trawiński, B. (eds) Computational Collective Intelligence. ICCCI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11683. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28377-3_44

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28377-3_44

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-28376-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-28377-3

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