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Correlating High- and Low-Level Features:

Increased Understanding of Malware Classification

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Advances in Information and Computer Security (IWSEC 2019)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11689))

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Abstract

Malware brings constant threats to the services and facilities used by modern society. In order to perform and improve anti-malware defense, there is a need for methods that are capable of malware categorization. As malware grouped into categories according to its functionality, dynamic malware analysis is a reliable source of features that are useful for malware classification. Different types of dynamic features are described in literature [5, 6, 13]. These features can be divided into two main groups: high-level features (API calls, File activity, Network activity, etc.) and low-level features (memory access patterns, high-performance counters, etc). Low-level features bring special interest for malware analysts: regardless of the anti-detection mechanisms used by malware, it is impossible to avoid execution on hardware. As hardware-based security solutions are constantly developed by hardware manufacturers and prototyped by researchers, research on low-level features used for malware analysis is a promising topic. The biggest problem with low-level features is that they don’t bring much information to a human analyst. In this paper, we analyze potential correlation between the low- and high-level features used for malware classification. In particular, we analyze n-grams of memory access operations found in [6] and try to find their relationship with n-grams of API calls. We also compare performance of API calls and memory access n-grams on the same dataset as used in [6]. In the end, we analyze their combined performance for malware classification and explain findings in the correlation between high- and low-level features.

The research leading to these results has received funding from the Center for Cyber and Information Security, under budget allocation from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

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Correspondence to Sergii Banin .

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Appendix A. Raw Data Sample

Appendix A. Raw Data Sample

In this Appendix we present a sample of a raw data gather during our experiments. We also explain each field included in the data.

  1. 1.

    Opcode id: each opcode is given a unique identifier. If this opcode is executed again (e.g. in a loop), it will receive the same id.

  2. 2.

    Module name: a name of a module where current instruction is executed, It can be a name of a library or a name of an executable itself.

  3. 3.

    Section name: a name of a section in executable file or library where current instruction is executed. Often it will be .text or CODE, however it some cases (especially with malware) a name of an executable section can be different from standard.

  4. 4.

    Current function name: if a function name of a current instruction can be found we record it to understand which function performed a certain part of logic.

  5. 5.

    Opcode: text representation of an assembly instruction together with arguments but without arguments values.

  6. 6.

    Type of module: whether an instruction is executed from the main module of executable under analysis or from the external library.

  7. 7.

    Memory operations: memory operations performed by an instruction. Only read or write without addresses and values.

  8. 8.

    Name of a function being called: if a current instruction is call - a name of a function is being stored.

A real example of raw data is present in the Listing 2. The first line represents header: names of fields are in the same order as in the list above.

figure b

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Banin, S., Dyrkolbotn, G.O. (2019). Correlating High- and Low-Level Features:. In: Attrapadung, N., Yagi, T. (eds) Advances in Information and Computer Security. IWSEC 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11689. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26834-3_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26834-3_9

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-26833-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-26834-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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