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Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1047))

Abstract

Bribery is a perilous issue in the real world, especially in an economical aspect. This fraudulence is unavoidable, and more importantly, it is more difficult to trace in case smart contracts are utilized for bribing on a distributed public blockchain. In our paper, we propose a new threat to the security of a blockchain system, cross-chain bribery using smart contracts. An arbitrary wealthy briber can utilize cross-chain smart contracts to manipulate a consensus mechanism on a victim’s blockchain or to disgrace a victim’s blockchain. To better understand this threat, our paper proposes a framework to analyze bribery using cross-chain smart contracts. We analyze the amount of incentive to bribe rational miners in a victim’s blockchain and also a full cost of conducting a cross-chain bribery attack. The result is that such attacks can be carried out with a reasonable amount of money or cryptocurrencies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Available from: https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/.

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Correspondence to Yang Lu or Weidong Shi .

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Tran, Q., Chen, L., Xu, L., Lu, Y., Shi, W. (2019). Cross Chain Bribery Contracts: Majority vs Mighty Minority. In: De La Prieta, F., et al. Highlights of Practical Applications of Survivable Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. The PAAMS Collection. PAAMS 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1047. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24299-2_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24299-2_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-24298-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-24299-2

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