Abstract
In this paper we associate a strategic non-cooperative game to a linear programming game; we analyze the relations between the core of the given game and the Nash equilibria of the strategic game.
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© 2004 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Fragnelli, V. (2004). A Note on the Owen Set of Linear Programming Games and Nash Equilibria. In: Gambarelli, G. (eds) Essays in Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library, vol 36. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2936-3_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5260-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-2936-3
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