Abstract
It has been pointed out that the Shieh-Yang-Sun ID-based authentication and key distribution protocol is vulnerable to the replay attack and the unknown key share attack. We further demonstrate that the protocol is vulnerable to the forgery attack, too. In addition, we describe an improved protocol that has better resistance ability to these attacks.
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Shieh, S.-P., Yang, W.-H., Sun, H.-M.: An Authentication Protocol without Trusted Third Party. IEEE Commun. Lett., Vol. 1 (1997) 87–89
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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ku, WC. (2002). An Improved ID-Based Authentication and Key Distribution Protocol. In: Chong, I. (eds) Information Networking: Wireless Communications Technologies and Network Applications. ICOIN 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2344. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45801-8_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45801-8_36
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