Abstract
The idea of the Oblivious Transfer, developed by Rabin, has been shown to have important applications in cryptography. M. Fischer pointed out that Rabin’s original implementation of the Oblivious Transfer was not shown to be secure. Since then it has been an open problem to find a provably secure implementation. We present an implementation which we believe will simplify the development of secure cryptographic protocols. Our protocol is provably secure under the assumptions that factoring is hard and that the message is chosen at random from a large message space.
Research sponsored in part by DARPA grant N00039-C-0235-9-83 and GTE fellowship
Research sponsored in part by NSF grant MCS-82-04506
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M. Rabin, Private Communication.
M. Fischer, Private Communication through M. Blum.
S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, Proofs with Untrusted Oracles, Department of Computer Science MIT and Department of Computer Science University of Toronto, 1983.
M. Blum, “Coin Flipping by Telephone,” Proc. IEEE COMPCON, pp. 133–137, 1982.
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© 1985 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Berger, R., Peralta, R., Tedrick, T. (1985). A Provably Secure Oblivious Transfer Protocol. In: Beth, T., Cot, N., Ingemarsson, I. (eds) Advances in Cryptology. EUROCRYPT 1984. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 209. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39757-4_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39757-4_26
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