Abstract
We introduce an executable formal model of abstract encryption using the specification language AsmL, based on Abstract State Machines of Gurevich, providing a simple executable models for cryptographic protocols. We show strong universality properties of our descriptions of patterns, protocol roles and environment behaviors-no ASM program can do better, given the same information.
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Rosenzweig, D., Runje, D., Slani, N. (2003). Privacy, Abstract Encryption and Protocols: An ASM Model - Part I. In: Börger, E., Gargantini, A., Riccobene, E. (eds) Abstract State Machines 2003. ASM 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2589. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36498-6_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36498-6_22
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